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Abstract 
 
Factlessness & Faultlessness: 
Individual Differences & Dimensions of Philosophical Dispute 
 
by 
 
Geoffrey S. Holtzman 
 
Advisor: Jesse Prinz 
 
This project addresses the question of why philosophical disputes persist, and tackles the 
problem of how we might better approach them. I demonstrate empirically several ways in which 
personality, gender, and other factors are associated with specific philosophical beliefs. 
Typically, one might assume that these individual difference factors are irrelevant to philosophy, 
and can only serve to bias philosophical disputants. Against this view, I present four case studies, 
which collectively highlight the different ways in which individual differences in lived 
experience may be inseparable from philosophical concepts themselves. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TRUE PREMISES, VALID INFERENCES, AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
 
Why do people disagree about the answers to philosophical questions? I take this to be the 
fundamental question of metaphilosophy. Only by identifying the contours of philosophical 
disputes, and the factors that draw people across those fault lines, can we best understand the 
concepts and theories in dispute. This may sound like a truism, but when more fully unpacked, it 
suggests a marked shift from the more traditional method of immediate reflection upon 
individual philosophical questions and theses. Notably, if there turns out to be a plurality of 
causes for the diversity of philosophical belief, then no single method of inquiry or dialogue will 
be sufficient for scrutinizing the entirety of the philosophical landscape. Instead, a variety of 
approaches will be called for. But in order to know what approach to take to a given 
philosophical questions—that is, what kind of answer is to be sought after—we need a taxonomy 
of causes of philosophical dispute. A taxonomy of this kind could help clarify kinds of 
philosophical problems, and modes of resolution. My purpose here is to develop, defend, deploy, 
and demonstrate such a taxonomy. 
In Chapter One, I lay the groundwork for my approach in three steps. First, I discuss the 
standard approach to resolving theoretic disputes in philosophy. This approach represents a kind 
of methodological monism, as there is assumed to be only one acceptable form and content for 
the arguments given by disputants, and all others are thought to be wrong (§1.2.). Second, I make 
the case that a different approach—a methodological pluralism—is demanded by the nature of 
philosophical problems (§1.3.). Third (§1.4.), I develop and defend a 2x2 taxonomy of 
philosophical divergence, which is meant as a first pass at formalizing this methodological 
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pluralism. Fourth (§1.5.), I discuss how one would apply the approach I advocate. In Chapters 
Two through Five, I apply this taxonomy to a series of questions in philosophy, and in particular 
in the philosophy of moral agency, in order to illustrate its philosophical utility and to 
demonstrate its explanatory and predictive value. Chapter Six returns to the abstract issues 
discussed in this first chapter, rooting them in knowledge accumulated in the pages between the 
two. 
  
1.1. Diagnosis & Prescription in Analytic Philosophy 
 
How can we resolve philosophical disagreements in cases of seeming theoretic stalemate? The 
first step is to identify the factors that cause people to hold different philosophical views in the 
first place. No earnest attempt to solve a problem can be made without a prior effort to diagnose 
the exact nature of the problem; diagnosis precedes prescription. Traditionally, unsound 
philosophical arguments are diagnosed according to two dimensions. I describe them here, then 
go on to explain why they are insufficient to capture the causes of, or potential resolutions to, 
many philosophical disputes. 
 
1.1.1. Facticity: The truth or falsity of premises 
 
Hume divided the realm of human inquiry into two mutually exclusive kinds: “matters of fact,” 
and “relations of ideas” (1740/2003). Modern philosophy, which emerged in the 16th century, 
was defined by a radical shift in the way we establish the former. This shift led philosophers 
away from reliance on the Bible, ancient philosophy, and empirical observation, and toward the 
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use of intuitive premises. Today, the rejection of empirical premises may still be the defining 
characteristic of much philosophy. 
It may be from Descartes that analytic philosophers derive their peculiar use of the term 
‘intuition.’ While the definition and role of intuition in contemporary philosophy is subject to 
debate (Cappelen, 2013), for the purposes of this project I will define the term negatively and in 
accordance with Descartes. Here, I will use the term ‘intuition’ to mean ‘insensate apperception,’ 
in strict contrast with sensory perception:  
 
Its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has 
never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an 
intuition of the mind. 
 
In both modern and analytic philosophy, it is typical to say that an intuition is right if it leads us 
to embrace a fact that turns out to be true, and wrong if it leads us to embrace a premise that is 
actually false. 
 
1.1.2. Faultiness: The rationality or irrationality of inferences 
 
Analytic philosophy, like modern philosophy, is distinguished from science by its use of intuitive 
rather than observational evidence to establish matters of fact. Analytic philosophy further 
distinguishes itself from modern philosophy primarily by formalizing the conception of the 
“relations between ideas,” by which we identify fault. In 1879, Frege published the first fully 
axiomatized system for analyzing complex sentences (1879/1931). By 1906, Russell had proven 
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that the completeness of such a system of predicate calculus could be achieved with just a single 
binary operator, negation, applicable equally to both predicates and the objects of their 
predication (1906). These advancements paved the way for a more formal method of 
philosophical inquiry to come into fashion (primarily in the English-speaking world) at the turn 
of the 20th century. For this reason, Frege and Russell are considered the forefathers of analytic 
philosophy. 
Analytic philosophers typically seek to adjudicate theoretic deadlocks through the 
deductive elimination of all and only those arguments that are unsound, invalid, or both. Theses 
whose only support comes from such arguments are expected to fall by the wayside, until just a 
single sound argument yields a guaranteed conclusion that can be validly inferred from true 
premises. Faulty reasoning (which undermines both validity and soundness) and false premises 
(which undermine soundness), it is usually assumed, are the two causes of flawed arguments 
whose conclusions are not guaranteed, and which therefore fail to provide the justification 
necessary for knowledge. Because two arguments are only guaranteed to converge on the same 
conclusion if each is flawless, philosophical disagreements are generally thought to arise because 
one or more disputants has drawn her conclusions on the basis of faulty reasoning, false 
premises, or both. But this traditional explanation of why disputants disagree may be overly 
simplistic. 
 
1.2. Criticisms of the Analytic Project 
 
Can philosophical disputes always be adjudicated by appeal to universally accessible 
facts and decisive proof of fault? Analytic philosophy assumes that we can answer this 
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question in the affirmative. But against this immediate, analytic approach to theoretic 
adjudication, I offer a number of criticisms, arguing that the underlying causes for the 
diversity of philosophical intuition are, themselves, diverse. The forms of this diversity 
arise from two oft-overlooked sets of contrastive features of philosophical disputes. 
 
1.2.1. Factive vs. factless disputes 
 
Analytic philosophers typically pride themselves on the abolishment of false premises from their 
arguments, but the grounds for this pride remain in dispute. Many discontents within analytic 
philosophy believe that philosophers’ efforts to eradicate false premises from their arguments (by 
employing intuition rather than observation) have had unintended and deeply problematic 
consequences. One question these discontents raise is whether all arguments in traditional 
analytic philosophy actually operate on exclusively (Gibbard and Blackburn, 1992) or even any 
evidential (true, or even false) premises at all (Ayer, 1952; Hare, 1952;).  
Are the intuitions that divide philosophical disputants always mutually truth-apt “matters 
of fact,” portraying either truths or falsehoods about some single set of facts, or are some such 
premises factless? Such cases often seem to arise when the evidentiary basis for an argument is 
not or cannot be (mutually) agreed upon by theoretic disputants. Both factive and factless 
disputes can be further distinguished into two kinds each. 
 
1.2.1. Faulty vs. faultless disputes 
  
The orthodox view has it that all arguments can be categorized—regardless of the truth of their 
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premises—as either rational or irrational. An argument that assumes some “relations between 
ideas” without logical warrant is invalid, and therefore fails to support its conclusion. All other 
arguments are valid, and if they are also sound—if their premises are also all true—then they 
guarantee the truth of their conclusions. A belief is only rational if it is based on valid arguments, 
where beliefs derived from invalid arguments—even though they may turn out to be right—are 
irrational. But again, we might question whether this is really the case, or whether there might be 
some philosophical arguments do not fall into either category.  
Such cases might arise, for instance, when the frame of reference for an argument is not 
or cannot be mutually agreed upon by theoretic disputants. One example where this seems to 
have occurred is in the debate among mathematicians (Arbesman and Strogatz, 2008; McCotter, 
2008; Rockoff and Yates 2009) as to whether Joe DiMaggio’s 56-game hitting streak was “so 
many standard deviations above the expected distribution that it should not have occurred at all” 
(Gould, 1988). Other cases might arise when a person satisfies the “state-requirements” for 
rationality, despite failing to meet the “process-requirements,” as in the hypothetical case of a 
man who resolves a conflict between inconsistent beliefs by dropping one due to an electric 
shock (Kolodny, 2005). In cases like these, philosophical disputes may simply be arational, 
capable of accommodating two or more incompatible modes of resolution, each of which is 
nevertheless faultless 
 
1.3. The Taxonomic Project 
 
These contrastive characteristics—factiveness vs. factlessness, and faultiness vs. faultlessness—
interact to suggest a taxonomy of philosophical questions. The application of this taxonomy is 
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demonstrated in Chapters 2-5. Each of these chapters focuses, at least in part, on a different 
aspect of philosophical cognition. However, all of these chapters focus, at least partly, on what 
has traditionally been conceived of as a single philosophical question. This is the question of 
whether agents ever deserve to be blamed for choosing immoral courses of action, if their 
participation in those courses of action was already determined by external forces prior to their 
making any choices at all. Thus, while these chapters can be read individually, they may also be 
read as a unified whole. By focusing on different taxonomic kinds of philosophical disputes we 
engage in about this putatively singular question, I show that it is in fact comprised of many 
disputes.  
 
1.3.1. Chapter Two: Factless, faultless disputes 
 
Concepts that are rooted in phenomenological experience seem especially likely to be 
fundamentally informed by sensory experience that cannot be shared with others. In Chapter 
Two, I demonstrate this point by identifying a number of cases in which the views of 
professional philosophers are predicted by their personalities. Philosophers who are given to 
worry and moodiness are more likely than their colleagues to deny that a robot could ever 
experience love; philosophers who have a penchant for the arts are more likely than their 
colleagues to say that a brain cannot think unless it is connected to a body. The contours for 
defining central pieces of evidence for these views—what it means to think, and what it means to 
love—are rooted in first-personal experiences whose factual denial by a third party is simply 
impossible. Furthermore, if two interlocutors are unwittingly discussing different concepts from 
each other, it is possible for them to both have internally consistent views, even if they do not 
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draw the same conclusions as one another. 
 
1.3.2. Chapter Three: Factive, faulty disputes 
 
There are, of course, many cases where at least one of two philosophical arguments must be 
wrong. In Chapter Three, I take on the widely cited argument that the dearth of female 
philosophers can, at least in part, be attributed to the fact that “women students are more likely 
than men students to find that their intuitions about the thought experiments discussed in their 
philosophy classes are at odds with those of their instructor” (Buckwalter and Stich, 2013). 
 
1.3.3. Chapter Four: Factless, faulty disputes 
 
Sometimes, what appear to be two contradictory views about a theory turn out to be two 
compatible but incommensurate views about two slightly different theories. In Chapter Four 
(Holtzman, under review A), I argue that previous characterizations of faulty reasoning in 
compatibilist belief may apply in some cases, but not in all of the cases in which philosophers 
seem to think that they do. Unless we know whether people take moral responsibility and free 
will to refer to different things in different contexts, we cannot tell the difference between a 
person who is irrational in the application of one concept, or rational in the application of two 
concepts for which the same word is used. And in many other cases, there are potentially shared 
facts about which disputants could directly disagree, but interlocutors are often discussing 
identifiably different facts without realizing it. When this occurs alongside the absence of a 
univocal rational structure for evaluating these facts, we have relativism, as mentioned earlier. 
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But this can also occur in the presence of a rational decision structure, as I argue is often the case 
when disputants fail to converge on a conclusive attribution of agency. 
 
1.3.4. Chapter Five: Factive, faultless disputes 
 
In Chapter Five, I then look at a case in which there seem to be objective facts of the matter, yet 
knowing the truth about those objective facts might do nothing to resolve certain disputes. This, I 
think, may be common when two sides are interpolating the normative-ethical implications of 
some descriptive fact. In Chapter Five specifically, it can be seen that even if we knew whether a 
certain gene did or did not increase the risk of recidivism, our factual discovery provides us with 
reasons that could reasonably lead to contrary courses of action. If a certain gene makes 
criminals more likely to recommit, we might infer that he should be kept behind bars to 
minimize harm to society; yet we also might infer that he should be left free since he was 
predisposed to reoffend by factors outside of his control. Here, the facts may be decisive but the 
reasoning is not; this is a case of monist relativism. 
I devote Chapter Six to summarizing the taxonomy just laid out, and to setting for a plan 
of action for moving forward. Thus, my approach seeks to foster philosophical understanding by 
identifying the underlying causes of philosophical disagreement, in terms of component 
processes that are themselves philosophical disagreements.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
PERSONALITY EFFECTS 
 
An objection to an analysis consists in pointing to something intuitively evident 
that conflicts with it.  
–Jackson, Oppy, and Smith, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness” 
 
When an intuition conflicts with an analysis of some concept, phenomenon, or course of events, 
is it always appropriate to say that we have evidence for an objection to that analysis? Analytic 
philosophers have, historically, taken the answer to be yes, but a number of recent works have 
cast doubt on this assumption. This chapter questions that fundamental assumption of analytic 
philosophy in a unique way, by identifying several ways in which personality informs 
philosophical belief. In the present study, individuals holding doctorates in philosophy were 
given a personality inventory and asked to respond to nine philosophical questions, seven of 
which produced significant sample sizes. Personality predicted response to three of these seven 
questions, suggesting that philosophers’ beliefs are determined in part by their personalities.   
In first publishing these results, I took them to show that “at least some part of 
philosophy, however small, is subjective” (emphases added; Holtzman, 2013). This, roughly 
speaking, characterizes the present chapter as one in the vein of experimental philosophy’s 
negative project, the purpose of which is primarily to undermine the methods, claims to 
knowledge, and purported expertise of professional philosophers (Knobe and Nichols, 2013). I 
stand by my initial claim that part of philosophy is subjective, a term I use in here in an 
approximate sense, to refer to claims that, more strictly speaking, may be situated in disputes that 
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are simultaneously faultless and factless. Because I stand by my initial claim, I endorse reading 
this chapter as one with a largely negative thesis. But my negative claims are part of a broader, 
positive project: I also stand by my claim that some part of philosophy, however small 
exemplifies this characteristic subjectivity. The expansion of this initial research program in later 
chapters thus reveals that both the negative and positive projects emerge naturally from the study 
described in this chapter.  While I have not, strictly speaking, revised the view or abandoned the 
thesis defended in this initial project, in each chapter I broaden my thesis to include everything 
discussed in the last chapter and, as such, narrow the range of philosophical questions to which I 
apply the term ‘subjective.’ My argument in this chapter, that we can accurately describe some 
philosophy as subjective, is meant to be quantified existentially, not universally. 
In relation to the chapters that come after it, the main development of Chapter Two is the 
identification of individual difference variables that characterize groups of persons along 
dimensions that are value-neutral and non-essential to those persons, but which correlate with 
certain philosophical views. In later chapters, I plan to show how individual differences can be 
treated as surrogate variables, predictors that allow us to compare groups of people who, on 
average, can be expected to differ in their views about some philosophical question. Unlike in 
traditional psychology, the soundness of the initial argument for why some surrogate variable 
should predict philosophical judgment is not, strictly speaking, essential to interpreting the data, 
nor to making progress in understanding the precise issues raised by certain philosophical 
disputes. Such explanations can be psychologically valuable, and may help advance philosophy, 
but are not necessarily intrinsically philosophically interesting. However, the interaction of these 
variables with aspects of different questions asked—in other words, the conceptual fault lines 
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within questions that lead different people to respond one way or another—are philosophically 
interesting. 
Still, many skeptics about experimental philosophy believe that nothing culled from the 
intuitions of people not trained in philosophy should be expected to have any direct bearing on 
deep philosophical questions. Because these sorts of skeptics believe that the contributions of 
experimental approaches drop off precisely at the philosophical junctions they claim to address, I 
call this flavor of skepticism the deflationist approach. One advantage of the work reported in 
this chapter is that, because the participants all held PhDs or DPhils in philosophy, these standard 
deflationist responses become self-undermining—after all, if philosophers’ viewpoints in general 
don’t matter, then their views on deflationism don’t either. I will reference general perspectives 
on experimental philosophy from this approach later in this chapter in a bit more detail in §2.1.1. 
(Kauppinen, 2007; Devitt, 2011). Chapter Four describes a more detailed, specific kind of 
deflationism about empirical studies of the belief that causal determinism is compatible with free 
will is, a view known as compatibilism. 
Traditional hypothesis-driven research and data mining can inform fruitful philosophical 
projects, so long as in both cases, sufficient replicability is demonstrated to assuage any potential 
methodological concerns associated with data mining (multiple statistical comparisons). Rather 
than concluding anything about personality per se, the purpose of this chapter is to develop 
hypothetical tools that may allow us to show that this alternate dimensions of the philosophical 
concepts in dispute. Here, I am only developing a tool to get at the core concepts, just like one 
might build a ladder to get at something otherwise out of reach. Later—at the ends of Chapters 
Four and Five— we will be able to “throw away the ladder” (Wittgenstein, 1921/2004). 
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2.1. The Nature of Philosophical Debate 
 
Why do arguments that seem so plausible to some philosophers always fail to persuade others? 
Philosophical inquiry is supposed to consist in the rational12 pursuit of objective truth, so it is 
curious that even highly trained philosophers, versed in all the same arguments and thought 
experiments, disagree about so many points. To the extent that philosophical conclusions are 
reached through intuition and reason, the persistence of philosophical disagreement suggests that 
something very personal drives philosophical intuition.  
 In this chapter, I consider the view that philosophers’ beliefs are partially founded on the 
basis of individual character and disposition rather than objective evidence and irrefutable 
reason. The present study examined the relationship between philosophers’ personalities3 and 
their responses to several thought experiments. The data generated provide initial evidence that 
philosophers’ personalities inform their beliefs regarding specific philosophical problems, one of 
which is studied more closely in every chapter of this project. I consider several alternative 
interpretations of my findings, but ultimately conclude that personality sometimes affects 
                                                            
1 In order to avoid confusion, I will define my usage of certain key terms, consistent with 
familiar usage as indicated by the Oxford English Dictionary. 
2 Rational: Based on universal norms of good reasoning, as opposed to emotion or individual 
preferences. 
3 Personality: The set of qualities that distinguish an individual. These include, but are not 
limited to, stable, long-lasting, internalized traits. I will use the term ‘personality’ consistent with 
the broader set of personality traits; context will make clear when it is also consistent with the 
aforementioned subset. 
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philosophical belief.4 I further argue that some—though not all—differences in belief owing to 
personality and individual differences are rightly characterized as subjective.5 Insofar as this is 
true, belief about some philosophical problems is subjective, and insofar as belief regarding 
philosophical problems is central to philosophical practice, philosophy that relies on these 
intuitions can properly be called subjective.  
 
2.1.1. Experimental Philosophy 
 
Historically, philosophers have drawn conclusions about the world on the basis of intuition and 
formal reasoning. More recently, experimental philosophers have begun to apply scientific 
methodologies to philosophical questions in order to understand how people think about them. 
One problem with traditional philosophical approaches is that a particular philosopher may have 
peculiar and unpopular intuitions. In an effort to address this concern, experimental philosophers 
have recently begun polling average people in order to discover “folk intuitions,” a term that 
many experimental philosophers use to refer to the philosophical beliefs of the average person. 
What these experimental philosophers have found has led them to suggest a fragmented and 
manipulable “folk” (Cokely & Feltz, 2009a). For this reason, it is unclear to what the ‘folk’ in 
                                                            
4 Philosophical belief: Attitude towards philosophical problems. Response to such problems 
presented as vignettes is sometimes referred to as philosophical intuition, but this latter term 
carries a connotation of unreasoned immediacy, which is inappropriate to describe the response 
of philosophers to questions they have likely considered at length.  
5 Subjective: Reflective of an individual non-privileged perspective, as opposed to entirely mind-
independent, universal standards. 
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“folk intuitions” is supposed to refer Cappelen (2013). I therefore use the phrase hesitantly, and 
only to refer to the work of others who use the phrase. 
  “Folk intuitions” have been found to vary across cultures (Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & 
Stich, 2004), to demonstrate frame effects (Nichols & Knobe, 2007), and to differ from the 
intuitions of professional philosophers (Machery & Systma, 2010). This chapter focuses on the 
relationship between personality and philosophical belief among philosophers, a relationship that 
has already been partially explored among lay people by Feltz and Cokely (2009a). They found 
that extraverts are uniquely predisposed to consider certain socially deviant acts harmful and 
immoral. They also identified a relationship between the personality trait openness and the belief 
that moral and physical facts may be subjective (Cokely & Feltz, 2008). 
Because extraverts are thought to devote excessive attention to social aspects of 
situations, Feltz and Cokely also hypothesized that extraverts might lose sight of deterministic 
aspects of such situations (2009b). This, they argued, would cause extraverts to be particularly 
likely to consider free will and responsibility compatible with determinism. The authors asked 
undergraduates to consider a deterministic universe, and found that extraverts were indeed more 
likely than introverts to consider murderers free and to hold them responsible for their actions. 
Studies have since confirmed that this effect only occurs when participants are given high-affect, 
concrete scenarios, a finding that strengthens the claim that extraverts’ attention to social details 
is responsible for the effect (Feltz & Cokely, 2009b; Nadelhoffer, Kvaran, & Nahmias, 2009).  
 Unfortunately, findings like these have often been dismissed as trivial on the grounds that 
unlike lay people, philosophers are uniquely capable of reasoning in a formal, objective manner, 
or that they possess the requisite expertise required to answer philosophical questions 
(Kauppinen, 2007; Devitt, 2011). This study undermines those claims, and allays concerns that 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 16 
the effects of personality on philosophical belief are circumscribed to social and moral questions, 
as none of the three effects identified in this chapter falls within those domains. Whether factors 
that increase people’s tendencies to judge free will and determinism compatible do so by 
supporting their core competencies, or instead by causing them to commit performance errors, is 
also major point of contention among experimental philosophers. These concerns cannot be 
addressed in this chapter, but they will be revisited in §4.4. 
  
2.1.2. The Big Five Personality Traits 
 
In later chapters, I will discuss arational factors (which may serve as what I have called 
surrogate variables) other than personality, such as gender and situation, as they relate to and 
apparently influence philosophical belief. For now, however, I confine my discussion to 
individual differences in personality. Allport and Odbert launched modern personality research 
by examining the English lexicon, and identifying 18,000 words that describe human behavior 
(1936). They chose to focus their research on the 4,500 or so words that describe stable, long-
term personality traits, the kind that we often consider part of a person’s identity. Over several 
decades, they and others constructed numerous personality assessments, slowly eliminating 
highly correlated terms.  
Tupes and Christal (1961) were the first to identify a five-factor model of personality, 
and by the 1990s a consensus was reached about the comprehensiveness of five dimensions: 
Extraversion (or Surgency), Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism (as opposed to 
Emotional Stability), and Openness to experience (or Intellect). Because of the enormous breadth 
of each category, the factors became known as the Big Five personality traits (Digman, 1990; 
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Goldberg, 1992). Further research has shown many of these characteristics to vary across 
cultures (Eap, DeGarmo, Kawakami, Hara, Hall, & Teten, 2008), between genders, and with age 
(John, Gosling, & Potter 2003). 
 The precise definition of each trait remains controversial. Agreeableness measures 
several tendencies, including compliance, altruism, and supportiveness. Extraversion gauges how 
shy or outgoing a person is, and encompasses warmth, dominance, and sociability. There is 
debate as to whether conscientiousness is best understood as a sort of governor on impulsive 
behavior, or as an organizer of deliberate action. Neuroticism measures the frequency and extent 
to which individuals experience negative emotions, and the form and severity of their responses 
to these emotions. Openness measures intellect, aesthetic sensibility, creativity, and a number of 
other highly correlated factors (McCrae & John, 1992). 
 Several instruments have been developed to assess the Big Five, each with its pros and 
cons. The most commonly used assessment contains 100 unipolar trait descriptive adjectives; the 
most effective test, the Revised NEO Personality Inventory, contains 240 items. Recruiting 
participants to answer 240 questions online, and expecting them to do so with accuracy and 
attention, raises practical concerns, and so participants in my study were given the Big Five 
Personality Inventory (BFI). The BFI is a well-regarded personality survey composed of 44 
questions (John & Srivastava, 1999). 
 
2.2. Method 
 
1,195 participants were recruited through the social networking site Facebook and the general 
interest philosophy blog Leiter Reports. Of those who completed the entire survey, this chapter 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 18 
looks only at the 234 philosophers who held PhDs or DPhils in philosophy. Philosophers who 
participated were predominantly white (94%), male (82%), from Western or Australasian 
countries (100%), and were of all ages and socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Participants were directed to a five-page survey on the website SurveyMonkey, where 
they were required to mark all questions but allowed to indicate a preference not to respond. On 
the first page of the survey, participants were briefed and asked to acknowledge consent and age 
of majority. The second page consisted of nine randomized “Yes” or “No” philosophical 
prompts, listed in the Appendix. Questions 5, 6, 7, and 9 borrowed heavily from famous thought 
experiments devised by other philosophers (Kripke, 1980; Gettier, 1963; Jackson, 1986; 
Thomson, 1976). Page three had 51 personality questions that were scored on a Likert scale from 
1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly), the first 44 of which comprised the BFI. These 
questions were not randomized, and BFI items were presented first and in the same order 
described in John and Srivastava (1999). Page four consisted of 7 demographic questions, and 
the last page thanked and debriefed participants. Because all responses were self-reported and 
unmonitored, there was the usual risk of false reports. 
 
2.3. Results 
 
Participants’ BFI scores were calculated from raw data as the average of responses given for 
each facet. Respondents who chose not to answer a given philosophical question were excluded 
from that question’s analysis. For each philosophical question, a binary logistic regression was 
run, in which all five personality traits and a constant were entered into the model. A summary of 
results for each overall model and each trait-belief pair is presented below (Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Correlations Between Personality Factors and Philosophical Beliefs 
 
E A C N O Overall 
1. Compatibilism 
      2. Fairness 
      3. Somatic Identity 
      4. Reductionist AI 
  
* * 
 
*** 
5. Descriptivism 
 
* * 
  
* 
6. Gettier/Knowledge 
   
* * *** 
7. Knowledge Argument 
   
* 
  8. Embodied Cognition 
 
* 
  
* ** 
9. Trolley Problem 
   
* 
  Note. E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; N = Neuroticism; O = 
Openness. Numbered philosophical beliefs were tested with the corresponding prompts listed in 
the Appendix. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** Bonferroni-corrected p < .006  
 
In order to reduce the risk of false positives, each personality trait was force-entered into 
the regression, rather than entered stepwise. Only those questions for which a significant overall 
effect was found are considered below, in order to keep the number of initial comparisons to 9, 
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rather than 45. A Bonferroni correction for the use of 9 comparisons provided an even more 
conservative test. Question 3 (which did not exhibit significant overall effects) and Question 6 
(which did exhibit significant overall effects) were excluded from further discussion because 10 
or fewer participants responded “Yes,” to these questions, reducing the number of questions 
discussed from nine to seven. 
For each regression model, χ2 measures the extent to which the observed pattern of 
responses differed from what one would expect if personality and philosophical belief were 
entirely independent. The associated Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 reflects the extent to which the 
observed results differed from those predicted by the model. Greater χ2 scores reflect greater 
dependence of philosophical belief on personality, and greater Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 scores 
reflect greater independence. The p-value of each of these scores represents the probability that 
the observed score was due to chance.  
 
2.3.1. Dualism: Could a Robot Feel Love? 
 
Participants were asked the following question: 
 
Suppose neuroscientists are able to identify every part and every connection in the human 
brain. Working with a team of computer scientists, they then build a robot that has a 
complete electronic replica of the human brain. Could this robot experience love? 
 
 Most philosophers (73%, N = 202) believed that a robot with a replica human brain could 
feel love. The Big Five had a significant overall effect on this belief, χ2  = 16.498, p < .01, and 
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the model was a somewhat good fit, Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 14.522, p = .069. As shown in 
Table 2, neuroticism and conscientiousness were both significant predictors of response. 
Table 2 
Could a Robot Feel Love? 
95% CI for Exp(B) 
Personality Trait B SE B Lower Exp(B) Upper 
Conscientiousness       -.916* .37722 .191 .400 .839 
Neuroticism -.728* .294 .271 .483 .860 
Note. B = Regression coefficient. Exp(B) = Odds ratio. 
* p < .05
B is the value used to predict philosophical response from each significant personality 
factor. Negative values indicate that a factor is associated with disagreement, and positive values 
signal agreement. B was also converted into the odds ratio, Exp(B), which indicates that for each 
unit increase in a given personality factor (on a four-unit scale), philosophers’ odds of holding 
the target belief changed by that factor. For each unit increase in neuroticism or 
conscientiousness, philosophers’ odds of believing that a robot could feel love fell by more than 
half. 
2.3.2. Descripitivism: Are Names Identical With Descriptions? 
The next question on the survey asked the following: 
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Suppose that all you know about Einstein is that he developed the Theory of Relativity. 
But suppose it turns out that Einstein actually stole the idea from some guy named 
Moynahan, who nobody has ever heard of. In this case, when you use the name 
“Einstein,” are you actually referring to Moynahan? 
The predominant view among philosophers (87%, N = 202) was that the name “Einstein” 
could not refer to someone other than Einstein. Overall personality predicted response to this 
question, χ2  = 14.140, p < .05, and the model was a very good fit, Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 
8.359, p = .399. Agreeable philosophers were less likely to identify the name “Einstein” with 
Moynahan, the man who fit the description, but conscientious philosophers were more willing to 
assign Moynahan the name “Einstein” (Table 3). 
Table 3 
Are Names Identical With Descriptions? 
95% CI for Exp(B) 
Personality Trait B SE B Lower Exp(B) Upper 
Agreeableness -.922* .364 .195 .398 .812 
Conscientiousness 1.043* .486 1.095 2.838 7.354 
Note. B = Regression coefficient. Exp(B) = Odds ratio. 
* p < .05
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2.3.3. Embodiment: Could a Brain Think Without Being Connected to a Body? 
The following question probed belief about the embodied mind thesis: 
Suppose scientists are able to use stem cells to grow lungs that breathe without being 
connected to a body. They then grow a heart that pumps without being connected to a 
body. If they can do all this, can they create a brain that thinks without being connected 
to a body? 
About half of philosophers believed that a disembodied brain could not think (54%, N = 
205). Differences in overall personality modeled differences in belief, χ2  = 15.375, p < .01, and 
the model was a good fit, Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 = 3.220, p = .920. Increases in 
agreeableness and openness were associated with more negative responses, indicating an 
increased belief in the embodied mind thesis (Table 4).  
Table 4 
Could a Brain Think Without Being Connected to a Body? 
95% CI for Exp(B) 
Personality Trait B SE B Lower Exp(B) Upper 
Agreeableness* -.549* .273 .338 .577 .985 
Openness* -.752* .308 .258 .471 .861 
* p < .05
Note. B = Regression coefficient. Exp(B) = Odds ratio. 
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2.4. Discussion: Do Personality Effects Mean Philosophy is Intrinsically Subjective? 
The present analysis found that of the seven thought experiments considered, three were subject 
to overall personality effects. Running seven tests on a single data set can significantly increase 
the risk of a Type 1 error—a false positive—but the likelihood of finding two effects in seven 
tests, each significant to α = .015, is itself significant to p = .004; the likelihood of finding three 
such effects is p = .0001. In a separate analysis presented at the 2013 Social for Personality 
Social Psychology Annual Meeting (Holtzman, 2013), a fourth thought experiment in this study 
showed specific hypothesized personality and gender effects. A fifth question has already been 
found by other authors to be subject to frame effects (Nichols & Knobe, 2007), in addition to 
being replicated, reported, and modeled in Chapter Four (Holtzman, under review A). In essence, 
philosophically irrelevant factors have been shown to affect intuitions in five of the seven cases 
tested here. It remains an empirical question whether the two remaining vignettes appeal to 
subjective factors, but given the countless number of psychological and sociological factors in 
play, it seems highly likely.  
Regardless, the extent of the demonstrated effects shows just how dependent 
philosophical belief is upon philosophically irrelevant factors. Taken alongside findings that 
cultural upbringing and gender affect the philosophical intuitions of lay people, a picture 
emerges in which philosophical belief is subject to any number of personality factors. 
Participants in this study had devoted anywhere from five years to decades of their lives to 
studying philosophy at the highest level, but even this extent of philosophical training did not 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 25 
eliminate certain arational6 prejudices.7 
The mechanism by which personality affects response to thought experiments deserves 
attention, but will not be discussed here. In what follows, I argue that because personality affects 
philosophical belief, philosophical belief is subjective. I then develop the further view that large 
swaths of philosophy are therefore also subjective. Finally, I consider four major but not 
exhaustive objections to the contention that personality affects philosophical belief, and conclude 
that none holds up to scrutiny.  
2.4.1. The Connection Between Personality Traits and Subjectivity 
Beliefs affected by personality are by their very nature subjective. The fact that personality 
varies from person to person, and that there is no “right” personality to have, are central to the 
notion of personality. If philosophical beliefs are adopted in part on the basis of their appeal to 
non-objective values or motivations such as those measured by the BFI, then it is only fair to 
describe these beliefs as partially subjective.  
Consider the possibility that personality traits affect philosophical beliefs without lending 
them any sense of subjectivity—that philosophical problems are simply underdetermined, not 
6 Arational: Not within the domain of rational analysis, and therefore neither rational nor 
irrational. The results of arational processes may accidentally appeal, or fail to appeal, to 
rationality, but that this is a separate matter. 
7 I take “prejudice” to be capable of referring to both favorable and unfavorable inclinations. 
Prejudice, as understood here, may lead its subject towards or away from the truth, or may apply 
in the absence of any objective standards at all.  
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subjective. A doctor, for example, may maintain objectivity when choosing a course of treatment 
even if she is unsure what will work best. She has to fill in the unknowns somehow, but every 
doctor does, and this does not give us reason to call doctors’ opinions subjective. If philosophical 
problems are likewise underdetermined, a philosopher could fill in the blanks on her own 
without properly being described as subjective. Unfortunately, this argument is convincing only 
in its vagueness. 
 My findings demonstrate that particular personality traits predict particular philosophical 
opinions. Therefore, a better analogy would be the discovery that the more neurotic a doctor is, 
the more likely she is to recommend prophylactic surgery, or that the more agreeable she is, the 
more likely she is to dispense painkillers to anyone who asks. These are obvious medical biases, 
ones so glaring and deleterious to medicine that they could present serious ethical concerns. To 
deny that my findings are equally worrying for philosophy is wishful thinking.  
  
2.4.2. The Connection Between Philosophical Belief and Philosophy 
 
It certainly seems as though many important zeitgeist shifts in 20th century philosophy owe 
primarily to thought experiments and the specific beliefs they elicit. The purpose of Kripke’s 
Gödel cases was to disabuse the descriptivist masses of beliefs Kripke thought to be mistaken. 
Jackson’s black-and-white room might not confine anyone to a unique view, but it would be 
difficult to argue that every belief about his thought experiment is consistent with every set of 
philosophical beliefs. Still, it is an empirical question whether deep philosophical theories 
demonstrate the same effects as philosophical vignettes, and whether vignettes actually affect 
philosophers’ views, and I can’t claim to answer those questions here. 
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Regardless, philosophy’s purpose is not merely to construct general theories about the 
structure of the world. It is also to describe the actual world in ways consistent with those 
theories. It is the rationality and objectivity of this latter aspect of philosophical practice—in 
which ethicists claim to know what is the right thing to do, and metaphysicians claim to know 
who is whom—that this study impugns. Insofar as philosophy purports to provide tools for 
understanding our world, the subjectivity of philosophical belief in a given domain can properly 
called the subjectivity of philosophy in that domain.  
Of those philosophical endeavors that utilize intuitions about cases, some may be more 
prone to personality effects than others, and some personality effects may be more rightly 
characterized as evidence of the subjectivity of philosophy than others. The objective evidence in 
favor of some beliefs may be so strong as to eliminate most or all subjective effects, but many 
problems fall somewhere along a spectrum of subjectivity. Just how much of philosophy is 
subjective, and just how subjective, remains an open question.  
 One might protest that philosophers could be subjective without causing philosophy to 
be. It is possible, after all, for individual doctors to be subjective without endangering the 
objectivity of medicine. However, the same cannot be said of philosophers and philosophy. 
Medical treatments and experiments yield observable outcomes, which provide an objective 
indication of which notions are right and which are wrong. But for some philosophical problems, 
the only data we have are our beliefs. Without any impersonal check on personal views, the 
subjectivity of practicing philosophers can rightly be called the subjectivity of philosophy.  
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2.4.3. Objection: The Discovered Effects Are Philosophically Uninteresting 
 
It is important to determine whether the personality differences identified here truly predict 
philosophical disagreement, or merely differences in gut reaction that lead to disputes between 
views that are, strictly speaking, incommensurate rather than contradictory or mutually 
exclusive. Only in the former case would these findings tell us something meaningful about 
philosophy. There are three distinct questions in this vein. 
 First, do neurotic philosophers object to certain ascriptions simply as a matter of 
antagonism? Jesse Prinz and Joshua Knobe (personal communication) have both suggested that 
neurotic philosophers might simply object to a robot feeling love out of resistance to liberal use 
of the term “love,” not necessarily as expressions of their deeper philosophical views regarding 
the relevant phenomena. If so, this might only be a case of philosopher bias, rather than 
philosophical subjectivity. However, this explanation cannot be right in this particular case. 
Antagonism is defined on the BFI as the opposite of agreeableness, and though neuroticism and 
agreeableness have been shown to correlate slightly negatively (-.28) (John & Srivastava, 1999), 
agreeableness itself did not predict response to this particular question.  
 Second, when disagreeable philosophers respond ‘No’ to questions, are they expressing 
genuine theoretical beliefs, or merely being negative? Disagreeableness actually predicted a 
‘Yes’ response to both questions for which agreeableness was a predictor of response, so this 
worry also seems unfounded. 
 Finally, when disagreeable philosophers express dissident views, are they expressing 
genuine theoretical differences from the mainstream, or merely being curmudgeonly? In this 
study, antagonism correlated with heterodox responses to both questions for which it was a 
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predictor. Whether or not this is because disagreeable philosophers are preconditioned to adopt 
unpopular views is unclear, but even if that were the case, that would only bolster the claim that 
subjective factors influence professional philosophers’ philosophical beliefs. 
While this shows that many personality effects on philosophical belief may be of 
philosophical import, this does not mean that that all such effects are. Cases of subjectivity, in 
which the prejudices of different lived experience are inseparable from the philosophical 
questions themselves, are just one kind of case. There are surely cases of bias in which an 
objectively false view is embraced by some theorists for reasons that are not only irrelevant to 
philosophical inquiry, but which turn out to undermine the pursuit of truth.  
For example, it would not be surprising if, prior to the Copernican revolution (and 
perhaps also after it), belief in a geocentric universe was highly correlated with religiosity. The 
idea of angels pushing with crystalline spheres in the heavens above a centralized Earth has more 
than a modicum of theistic appeal. But any potential correlation between geocentrism and 
religiosity does not render the former subjective, nor its disputes factless. Facts pertaining tothe 
truth or falsity of the relevant astronomical propositions theoretically can be (and, arguably, have 
been) established independent of individual differences in religious experience, faith, and 
practice.  
In cases like this, personality effects (should any exist) clearly must lead toward or away 
from the singular, identifiable, objective falsity of certain geocentric claims about epicycles. 
There can be no biasing toward or away from heliocentrism that is not, properly speaking, 
likewise a biasing toward or away from truth. Apparent retrograde motion simply does not occur 
because we observe, from our own stationary planet, other planets moving along spheres within 
spheres. Retrograde motion occurs because both our planet and other planets are racing in 
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ellipses around the sun. We occasionally “lap” planets more distal from the sun than we are, 
causing them to fade backwards in appearance, like cars being passed on the highway. Facts like 
these are true or false independent of subjective experience. 
 
2.4.4. Objection: The Big Five Do Not Truly Assess “Personality” 
 
Neuroticism, for instance, is not wholly reducible to the kinds of questions asked on personality 
inventories, and a highly neurotic person could score lower on this facet of the BFI than someone 
we would not consider highly neurotic. Though the BFI measures certain prominent personality 
traits effectively, one might hesitate to grant that it measures extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness per se. And even if the BFI were a perfect metric, 
the kinds of self-reports used here face obvious limitations.  
Nonetheless, the objection is myopic. Even if BFI scores do not perfectly reflect the 
personality traits they claim to, they still evaluate important personal inclinations. And even 
though self-reports may be biased8, they still reflect the personality of the subject. In fact, even if 
the BFI reflected nothing that it purports to, its correlation with philosophical beliefs would still 
be disturbing. BFI scores reflect highly reliable9 subjective differences, and these subjective 
differences predict philosophical differences. Supposing that all of the above accusations are 
true, this study would still reveal a meaningful relationship between subjective factors and 
philosophical beliefs. 
                                                            
8 I intend ‘biased’ to be interpreted without its occasional connotation of being skewed towards 
or away from the truth. I simply mean skewed, regardless of any objective standards. 
9 For definition and estimates of reliability, see John & Srivastava (1999). 
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2.4.5. Objection: Personality Does Not Affect Philosophical Belief 
 
It is possible that my theory reverses the order of causation, and that philosophical belief affects 
personality and not the other way around. However, this is highly unlikely for a number of 
reasons. BFI scores remain relatively stable throughout a person’s lifetime, not changing much 
even after education (John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003). Personality develops long before 
philosophical belief, and lifelong characteristics cannot be informed by factors that form later. 
And many people may never think deeply about philosophical problems, despite having rich 
personalities. 
 One could go a step further and suggest that personality and philosophy do not affect 
each other at all, and are instead shaped by some common force. But if such a force shapes 
personality, it could only be described as affecting a person’s subjective values. Appealing to 
such a force, then, does little to support the claim that philosophical values are objective. 
  
2.4.6. Objection: The Philosophical Prompts Were Not Worded Fairly 
 
The prompts used in this study were created to be as neutral as possible, but are not perfect. 
Some readers will undoubtedly decry that the questions that were based on famous examples 
seem contrived and unrealistic. Other questions may appear to bring in concerns beyond those 
they claim to test. I will not defend the prompts against these charges, because I think the 
charges are apt. I believe that many of the vignettes may have been loaded or unrealistic, or at 
least failed to control for philosophically irrelevant factors. I admit that they appealed to certain 
sensibilities that may have clouded the issues. How else could I have found an effect?  
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This is the nature of philosophical thought experiments. Intuition pumps often take the 
fore in philosophical debates, despite distorting the issues. The claim that even the purest 
philosophical cases bring philosophically irrelevant factors into play does not weaken my 
argument—it is central to my argument. As such, the objection that these vignettes evoked 
biased responses is not really an objection at all. Subsequent studies could vary the wording of 
the prompts, but it is not clear what this would accomplish. If the same results were observed, the 
findings of this chapter would be bolstered. But if the effects disappeared, that would only 
suggest that framing and personality interact in a profound way to influence philosophical belief.  
Such interactions between seemingly irrelevant facts and individual difference factors 
are, in fact, central to the analyses discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Researchers who are 
interested in positive experimental philosophy projects should actively seek out these kinds of 
interactions. For example, one form of conceptual analysis, adapted from Carnap’s scientific 
notion of explication (1950), seeks to refine ordinary language philosophical concepts into more 
precise ones that “retain similarity of conceptual content with the explicandum, and increase 
precision, fruitfulness, and simplicity” (Shepherd and Justus, 2014). Refining ordinary language 
concepts into new concepts that maintain similarity to the old ones, that are precise in 
distinguishing the views of disputants, that are fruitful in resolving those disputes, and that 
simplify philosophical problems are all ends that the project presented here can help us achieve. 
One example of an explicatory interaction will be discussed in Chapter Four (Holtzman, 
under review B). There, it is revealed that two descriptions of a person’s causal history tend to be 
treated as equivalently exculpatory by one group of people, but differentially exculpatory by 
another group. This raises important questions about how the different lived experiences of these 
two groups may have given rise to these different tendencies in philosophical belief. This has 
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implications, for example, for all four goals of explication. Retaining similarity of conceptual 
content will require us to identify and retain only that content that tends to overlap between our 
two groups’ concepts. Increasing precision will require us to identify why and over what 
principles their two different readings emerge and fail to overlap. Increasing fruitfulness will 
mean finding a way to establish conditions such that our two groups, when employing our two 
descriptions, are less frequently at cross-purposes and simply talking past one another (Kuhn, 
1970). And simplicity, quite simply, may have to be sacrificed if we are to attain our first three 
goals. 
 
2.4.7. Conclusion: Some Parts of Philosophy Are Subjective  
 
Thought experiments are designed to be the great deciders in many philosophical debates.  When 
clever philosophers are convinced of a certain view, they often design thought experiments to 
demonstrate just how intuitive their positions are. But other philosophers invariably disagree 
about the results of those experiments, often for reasons they cannot explain. At such pivotal 
moments, their minds are already made up, in part by their unique personalities. This is why 
views that seem obviously right to some philosophers seem obviously wrong to others. Despite 
years of training, philosophers see certain problems from personal perspectives. To the extent 
that these philosophical stalemates are the result of intrinsic human limitations, they may never 
be resolved.  
It has not been my intention here to claim that there are no objective philosophical truths, 
nor to claim that there are. I have also not attempted to identify the locus or mechanism of 
philosophical subjectivity, although I think that these are rather interesting problems. I only hope 
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to have argued at least some part of philosophy, however small, is subjective, that personality 
effects are one manifestation of this subjectivity, and that philosophers may need to reappraise 
the ability of philosophy to discover objective truths.  
Philosophy’s aim has traditionally been to discover truth through reason and intuition 
alone. I have shown that reason and intuition are intimately tied to personality. It remains to be 
seen whether reason and intuition, philosophical or otherwise, can be divorced from personality 
factors, and I have only shown relationships in a limited number of cases. Still, the burden of 
proof now lies with the defender of traditional philosophical methods. In order to defend 
philosophy, philosophers must first defend the autonomy and transformative power of reason.  
 
2.5. Implication: Some Parts of Philosophy Are Not Subjective 
 
Earlier, I expressed my central thesis in terms of four kinds of philosophical disputes, noting that 
subjective disputes (which are both factless and faultless in nature) constitute just one of these 
kinds. Still, these results pave the way to study the other three kinds of dispute outlined earlier. 
In some cases, we will be fortunate enough to be able to construct a potentially sound and valid 
argument by adding a single, empirically testable premise, and then demonstrating its falsehood. 
Such is the case in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GENDER EFFECTS 
 
I shall try not to use statistics as a drunken man uses lampposts, for support 
rather than for illumination. 
 -Source unknown; commonly attributed to Mark Twain 
 
Lately, there has been a good deal of discussion about why there are so few women in 
professional philosophy. In particular, special attention has been given to a hypothesis put 
forward by Buckwalter and Stich (2013), who suggest that undergraduate women tend to have 
different philosophical intuitions than their professors, and that this leads them to leave the field. 
My first aim in this chapter is to debunk that idea. My second aim is to put forward an alternative 
hypothesis.  
 
3.1. Rejecting Beliefs, or Rejecting Believers? 
 
It has been discovered that philosophy PhDs are more likely to reject certain rule violations if 
they are especially neurotic (Holtzman, 2013). It has also been found that the opinions 
philosophy faculty express toward certain dilemmas can easily be swayed by presenting them 
with other, similar dilemmas first (Schwitzgebel and Cushman, 2013; Schwitzgebel and 
Cushman, in process). Why, then, should we expect that bias against an interlocutor, a student, a 
classmate, or oneself would have any less sway on the opinions we come to form about the 
philosophical views expressed by others? My hypothesis is that we should not expect that at all. 
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The idea that disposition plays a role in the establishment of philosophical beliefs has 
frequently been misinterpreted—often uncharitably—by both detractors and supporters of 
experimental philosophy. For detractors, caricature interpretations and straw man arguments 
have played a crucial role in criticisms of the movement. Those who inveigh against this view 
seem especially drawn to a line of attack that we might call the insufficiency of sentiment 
argument, which has deep roots in modern philosophy:  
 
It is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions 
should be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons made complicated relations 
examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained (Hume, 1777/1983). 
 
But the insufficiency of sentiment is a point that has been elucidated and endorsed by even the 
staunchest sentimentalists—in fact, Hume was the archetypal sentimentalist. So this worry can 
do little damage against that view when wielded against critics of experimental philosophy. 
Experimental philosophers themselves have often overlooked the distinction between 
fundamental faultlessness, and total incorrigibility. Now, say a philosophical dispute is 
fundamentally faultless if it is absolutely resistant to adjudication by appeal to objective reason. 
This definition is qualitative—it says only that there is something in the fundament of a 
disagreement against which appeal to rationality is essentially futile. But this in no way implies 
that either of the disagreeing views is totally, or even mostly, incorrigible. Notably, faultlessness 
concerns incommensurate sets of utterances that, when contrasted with one another, give rise to 
almost-but-not-technically arguments, and which may include utterances that are almost-but-not-
quite propositions. In contrast, incorrigibility refers to attitudes toward sets of utterances—
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attitudes that, if incorrigible because they are rooted in arational processes that are not truth-
evaluable, cannot rightly be called beliefs. This leads us to an important contrast I wish to draw 
between a set of views that I endorse, and set of views that I reject. I endorse athesis of 
faultlessness in many areas of philosophy, according to which differences between philosophical 
theories are essentially unadjudicatable. I reject the incorrigibility thesis, which I take to be a 
view about persons, according to which the conflicting theoretic endorsements people make are 
essentially unrevisable. 
Hume recognized that for all the import of individual differences in determining moral 
character, education may play an even larger role. The juxtaposition of individual differences in 
disposition, and diversity of educational experience forms the crux of this chapter. Here, my 
intent is to demonstrate the theoretic myopia and practical problematicity of misinterpreting the 
fundamental faultlessness of theories as the incorrigibility of theorizers. I intend this exploration 
to double as a cautionary tale of what happens when one crosses the line from characterizing 
disputes as faultless to characterizing persons and their views as incorrigible. 
 
3.2. Focus on the Expert/Gender Assumption 
 
Why are there so few women in philosophy? Lately, there has been a good deal of discussion 
about the causes of this undesirable state of affairs. In particular, special attention has been given 
to a hypothesis put forward by Buckwalter and Stich (2014), whose view has been summed up 
beautifully in a takedown by Louise Antony: 
 
Their idea is that if women have different intuitions about standard thought-experiments  
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than men do, and if men dominate philosophy, then women studying philosophy may 
come to the conclusion—or be told explicitly— that they just don’t “get” philosophy—
that philosophy is not the subject for them (2013). 
 
My central aim in this paper is to debunk the idea that women tend to have heterodox 
philosophical intuitions, and that these intuitions, “when combined with one of the standard 
methods invoked in doing and teaching philosophy, have the potential to generate unconscious 
and unintentional biases against women.” I think it much more likely that the nature of 
philosophical debate simply enables general, pre-existing biases against women to influence 
philosophy professors more strongly than they can influence professors of academic disciplines 
in which appeal to objective truths (of the kind “2 + 2 = 4”) is more straightforward. Crucially, 
this is not to say that the availability of objective truth is a panacea. Just as DNA evidence from 
thousands of crimes against women sits untouched on the shelves on evidence rooms across the 
country, objectively true answers classroom may be easily in the classroom ignored by 
professors and students with preexisting biases. 
In §3.2., I draw attention to a misguided, unsubstantiated, and evidently false assumption 
which, from a logico-deductive standpoint, is required by the argument mounted by Buckwalter 
and Stich. Although those authors never explicitly acknowledge this premise, it is strictly 
entailed by their empirical claims. Yet as I argue in §3.3., the premise is fundamentally 
misguided inasmuch as it implicitly undermines the very egalitarian advocacy that their 
empirical work is intended to support. In §3.4., I show their assumption to be unwarranted in the 
sense that the evidence they present is compatible with two competing propositions, neither of 
which they acknowledge, let alone falsify, and both of which contradict the premise they assume. 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 39 
I then reanalyze some of Buckwalter and Stich’s own data in §3.5., in order to show that the very 
evidence that they claim supports their view actually weighs against it. In §3.6., I suggest some 
lessons that the burgeoning field of experimental philosophy could learn from the mistakes made 
by Buckwalter and Stich. 
 
3.2.1. Rehashing the argument 
 
Adelberg et al. (2014) characterize the argument in Buckwalter and Stich (2014) as follows: 
 
(1) If women have different intuitions about philosophical thought experiments than 
men, then this would likely lead more women than men to stop taking more 
philosophy classes. 
 
(2) Women do have different intuitions about philosophical thought experiments than 
men. 
 
(3) So, more women than men are likely to stop taking philosophy classes, which is 
one cause of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy (Adelberg et al., 2014). 
 
Their project is meant as a theoretical refutation of premise (1) and an empirical refutation of 
premise (2), so their paper is doubly potent. Still, some readers might not be convinced by either 
of the arguments provided by Adelberg et al. However, there remains a third premise—the 
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expert/gender assumption—which is necessary to infer (3) on the basis of (1) and (2). I intend to 
show that this assumption holds up to neither logical nor empirical analysis:  
 
When male and female undergraduates have divergent philosophical intuitions, 
women’s views differ from those of their professors to a greater extent than men’s 
views do. 
 
I intended to argue against this premise, but first, I argue that the expert/gender principle 
assumes that gender differences remain constant across training belies an unwarranted 
essentialism, inasmuch as it assumes that male philosophical thinking is continuous across levels 
of training. Second, I show that whether one takes the expert/gender assumption to be 
essentialist, or merely one about intrinsic gender differences (as distinguished in Antony, 2013), 
its employment in advocating the greater representation of women in philosophy would appear to 
reduce that very argument to absurdity. Finally, I show that even if one does not accept either of 
these philosophical disputations, the conclusions of Buckwalter and Stich should still be rejected, 
because their critical assumption—that the evidence they provide supports the expert/gender 
principle—is directly undermined by some of the very data on which they build their case.  
 
3.2.2. Revisiting the Expert/Gender Assumption 
 
If most philosophers are men, then shouldn’t philosophers tend to have views like those of male 
undergraduates? This seems to be taken for granted by Buckwalter and Stich, and if true it would 
indeed justify the expert/gender assumption. But the assumption itself entails a troublesome 
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corollary. The expert/gender principle implies that as women develop philosophical expertise, 
they learn to think more and more like their male classmates already do. If this turned out not to 
be true, then there would be no reason to think that women’s intuitions were especially likely to 
be “unpopular” in the classroom in the way Buckwalter and Stich claim they are. Although 
Buckwalter and Stich would probably reject the claim that philosophers and male undergraduates 
tend to think alike, while female undergraduates are philosophical black sheep in need of a 
shepherd, this is what their view entails. Antony (2013) has already laid out an excellent and I 
think convincing critique of this “different voices” hypothesis, but even if the expert/gender 
assumption were warranted, it could only provide two reasons to encourage more women to 
enter philosophy. I do not think either would be embraced by Buckwalter and Stich, because 
their message is ultimately one intended to bolster equality. 
 First, if philosophical expertise is like mathematical expertise, in the sense of having 
intrinsic value and objective criteria of evaluation, then the expert/gender principle implies that 
men are “naturals” who require less training to become experts, whereas women can at best hope 
to catch up to men with training, but often find it too hard and quit. This reasoning seems both 
ill-founded and illogical. It is ill-founded because it would be inaccurate to describe the 
unpopularity of women’s answers in algebra class as the cause of their relative scarcity in upper-
level college mathematics courses, and a similar explanation of the gender imbalance in 
philosophy seems equally implausible. And it is illogical because if women actually were 
intrinsically worse than men at math, it would be imprudent to cite their impoverished skill as a 
reason in favor of their greater inclusion in the field. So if philosophy is like math, Buckwalter 
and Stich are advocating the inclusion of more women in the field precisely because they are bad 
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at it, and this makes no sense. Fortunately, I think Buckwalter and Stich have made it clear that 
they do not think philosophical expertise is of a kind with mathematical expertise. 
 Second, the authors have elsewhere expressed the opinion that the intuitions of 
professional philosophers are no more reliable than those of anyone else (Buckwalter, Stich, and 
Tobia, 2013). The consideration that philosophical training is not like mathematics dissolves a 
substantial portion of the potentially normative implications of their “different voices” view, but 
it would also seem to render their normative argument for balancing gender in philosophy 
absurd. Efforts over the past few decades to integrate women into math classrooms have 
successfully reduced the gender gap in math performance, and these efforts were motivated by 
an understanding that women were being deprived, discriminated against, and provided with 
opportunities unequal to those provided to men. But if philosophy is less like math and more 
like, say, whittling, the only two reasons to advocate for more women in the field would be that 
men do it and so women should do it to, or that not enough women do it and that’s reason 
enough why more should. Neither of these is a satisfactory call to action for fixing what may be 
the result of inegalitarian treatment and complex social dynamics. 
 
3.2.3. Reframing the Discussion 
 
The assertion that we ought to correct the gender imbalance in philosophy is compatible with the 
view that feeling excluded, the cause put forth by Buckwalter and Stich, is not the issue. I have 
suggested that pandering to “women’s intuitions” is an uncalled for, and quite possibly 
incoherent proposition, but that does not mean that no action should be taken. The idea that 
feeling excluded is the reason more women choose to leave philosophy not reflects a somewhat 
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low opinion of women. Why presume that women leave because “they don’t get it,” rather than 
because they “already know that.” It also requires us to make general assumptions about the 
psychology of women. If nothing else, this seems like a much more difficult task than looking at 
the behavioral data in front of us.  
Right now, you are looking at evidence that women are being excluded from 
consideration as expert philosophers. There is no need to formulate an opinion of women, or to 
guess at the psychology of others, to see this self-evident truth. A deeply and sometimes 
implicitly held prejudice against women-as-experts is not only an alternative to the expert/gender 
principle, but also a characterization of it. Buckwalter and Stich exclude the very possibility that 
women might perform adeptly in philosophy classrooms when they assume that: 
 
(a) In developing philosophical expertise, men’s views tend to remain fixed whereas 
women’s views tend to become more like those of male undergraduates. 
 
But this assumption is no more or less warranted than its contradiction:  
 
(b) In developing philosophical expertise, women’s views tend to remain fixed 
whereas men’s views tend to become more like those of female undergraduates. 
 
And both of these hypotheses are less parsimonious than a null hypothesis that, absent any 
evidence to the contrary, is by definition statistically more likely than the other two possibilities 
combined:   
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(c) In developing philosophical expertise, people do not learn to think more and more 
like their classmates of any particular gender already do. 
 
Buckwalter and Stich state that they see no rhyme or reason in the patterns of difference 
in their data, and so it may appear that they reject the notion of stereotypically feminine 
intuitions. But an unseen thread runs through all the cases for Buckwalter and Stich. Their entire 
argument is built on the assumption that women’s natural philosophical beliefs are, compared to 
those of their male peers, decidedly inexpert. Why not test their assumption against some of their 
own data? 
 
3.2.4. Reanalyzing the data 
 
Buckwalter and Stich claim that “there is little or no reliable data concerning professional 
philosophers’ intuitions in these cases” (2014), but this is false. Instead, Buckwalter and Stich 
seem to have fallen prey to a selection bias, having simply ignored data that were in their 
possession, and that undermine their view. This perhaps innocent failure to recognize the 
opportunity to falsify their hypothesis was compounded by the omission of data they collected 
but which failed to conform to their predictions. This latter methodological shortcoming 
represents a second, special kind of selection bias, which raises an issue known in the social 
sciences as ‘file-drawer problem.’ The most common way the file-drawer effect leads to false 
positives manifests is due to the hesitancy of journals and researchers to publish null effects 
(Rosenthal, 1979). But here, as Buckwalter and Stich seem to have overlooked data provided to 
them that undermined their a priori hypothesis. 
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Three of the nine externally discovered gender differences they report were drawn from a 
study that included over 200 participants who held either PhDs or DPhils in philosophy. 
Professional philosophers’ views on these cases have since been published (Holtzman, 2013), as 
have their attitudes toward six additional vignettes included in the same study. Buckwalter and 
Stich presumably analyzed all nine vignettes in that study, but chose not to report results from 
cases in which they were unable to find the undergraduate gender differences. Buckwalter and 
Stich also had access to data about the responses of male and female non-academics and 
philosophy professors to eight additional ethical dilemmas, but chose not to report these data, 
either. These data have been available online for several years, and reveal gender differences in 
only one of eight cases (vegetarianism); and in that one case, women were more likely than men 
to respond in the same way as professional philosophers (Schwitzgebel and Rust, 2011).  
To see if the women discussed in Buckwalter and Stich’s paper actually thought less like 
professional philosophers than the men did, I reanalyzed the sole dataset cited in their paper for 
which this hypothesis was actually testable, as it was the only one that contained data from 
philosophy PhDs. Three of their nine external results were originally tested for “Do Personality 
Effects Mean Philosophy is Intrinsically Subjective?” (Holtzman, 2013), which measured the 
responses of philosophers and non-philosophers to nine “Yes” or “No” philosophical questions. 
Critics of Buckwalter and Stich have called for public access to the results they collected 
but did not include in their paper, and so I have include all nine results from Holtzman (2013) 
here, which reflect responses to the full questions that appear in that paper’s appendix. For all 
analyses below, chi-squares were conducted to compare the raw mean responses (Cohen, 1988) 
of male non-philosophers (n = 104), female non-philosophers (n = 93), and total philosophy 
PhDs who indicated gender (n = 232; 17.3% female). Pairwise chi-squares comparing scores of 
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non-philosopher men and/or women to overall PhD scores are reported for all cases in which 
those tests achieved statistical significance. For cases in which this did not occur, chi-square 
scores for the overall 3x2 table are presented. All charts represent the proportion of each 
population sample whose answer implied agreement with a particular view. 
Omnibus tests showed that among non-philosophers who answered all nine questions, 
across the nine cases, women were significant more likely than men to share the opinions of 
professional philosophers F22, 152) = 5.018, p < .001. Of the three cases reported in Buckwalter 
and Stich, none supports the hypothesis that women tend to have different intuitions about 
thought experiments than professional philosophers do. When asked to make an abstract 
judgment of compatibilism, only the responses of men were significantly different from those of 
professional philosophers (Figure 1), and this same gender pattern arose for the knowledge 
argument (Jackson) (Figure 2). When asked to assess whether love could be reduced to a 
program a robot could run, the same overall trend appeared but no pairwise differences achieved 
significance (Figure 3).  
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Figure 1. Column marked /// was significantly different from PhD (Χ2315 = 11.405, p < .001). 
 
Figure 2. Column marked /// was significantly different from PhD (Χ2319 = 4.802, p < .05).  
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Figure 3. Overall Χ2384 = 6.096, p < .05. 
 
In three more cases from Holtzman (2013) not reported by Buckwalter and Stich, men 
but not women gave responses that were significantly different from those of philosophers. The 
first of these questions asked whether fairness in a certain case required adherence to the 
minimax principle (Figure 4), and the other asked whether it might be theoretically possible to 
create a brain that thinks without being connected to a body (Figure 5). In another case not 
reported by Buckwalter and Stich, in which subjects were asked to judge the ‘switch’ condition 
of the trolley problem (Holtzman, 2013), only women demonstrated a pattern of response 
significantly different from that seen among philosophers (Figure 6). 
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Figure 4. Column marked /// was significantly different from PhD (Χ2321 = 4.673, p < .05).  
 
Figure 5. Column marked /// was significantly different from PhD (Χ2298 = 4.580, p < .05).  
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Figure 6. Column marked /// was significantly different from PhD (Χ2284 = 6.935, p < .01).  
  
Two additional cases—a Gettier case regarding whether justified true belief might fall 
short of knowledge (Figure 7), and a Kripke case about whether names must be associated with 
descriptions (Figure 8)—elicited responses from both men and women that were significantly 
different from those given by professional philosophers. A final case, which contrasted the 
somatic and psychological conceptions of identity, revealed no significant difference in belief 
between any of the groups (Figure 9). 
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Figure 7. Columns marked /// were significantly different from PhD (Male Χ2321 = 4.265,  
p < .05; Female Χ2313 = 3.902, p < .05).  
 
Figure 8. Columns marked /// were significantly different from PhD (Male Χ2328 = 5.666,  
p < .05; Female Χ2319 = 19.573, p < .001). 
22.8% 22.6% 
13.6% 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
Male Female PhD 
Names refer by description, not causal history 
  
6.9% 
14.0% 
1.8% 
0% 
10% 
20% 
Male Female PhD 
Mistakenly justified true beliefs are still knowledge 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 52 
 
Figure 9. Overall Χ2397 = .363, p = .834.  
 
3.3. Rethinking the Moral of the Story 
 
Overall, there were four cases in which men’s views differed significantly from those of 
philosophers but women’s views did not. There was also one case where women’s views 
diverged but men’s did not, and four cases in which neither or both groups had significantly 
different views from those of professional philosophers. What should we make of this dataset as 
a whole? At this point, the only unreasonable interpretation of these data would be certainty 
about any hypothesis. My purpose in presenting these data is only to refute the notion that we 
have any reason to accept the expert/gender assumption, not to draw statistical inferences from 
this dataset to any positive hypothesis.  
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My positive view, then, is this: Pursuing an understanding of what characterizes the 
philosophical psychology of different groups, and working to improve working conditions in 
academia, are both important projects. However, convoluted arguments should be carefully 
attended for inadvertent implications that might be both false and easily falsifiable. Such 
premature claims can only stymie further, more conscientious research. This is a general point 
for experimental philosophy. It is true that analytic philosophers have historically given voice to 
certain groups more so than others. But if we really want to make progress, and to eliminate bias 
from the field, more of the same will not do the trick. Instead of using data to defend armchair 
intuitions, we should let the data speak for themselves. Even though good researchers like 
Buckwalter and Stich are interested primarily in uncovering the truth, and do not set out to 
defend their own a priori intuitions, it is all too easy for confirmation bias to creep in unless we 
treat our own views as alternative hypotheses, to be considered plausible only once we have 
rejected the null hypothesis. 
 Readers who agree would do well to read Adelberg et al. (2014). In addition to raising 
awareness of the dangers inherent in using data mining techniques like those employed in 
Buckwalter and Stich, they discuss three carefully considered ‘Further Problems’ with the 
explanation given by Buckwalter and Stich. Adelberg et al. developed these three alternative 
views scientifically—in the absence of evidence for or against these empirical possibilities—and 
treat their adjudication as open questions. Their work provides an exemplar of how experimental 
philosophers might use armchair intuitions to motivate scientific explorations in a more impartial 
way than Buckwalter and Stich do. It is ultimately a good thing that Buckwalter and Stich have 
spurred this much-needed discussion about conditions for women in philosophy, and extending 
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their project in the way Adelberg et al. have can only help improve our understanding of the 
situation. 
 
3.4. Building on the Results 
 
These results cannot tell us the causes of any potential gender differences in philosophical belief, 
and they are insufficient to direct us toward any particular course of effective action to remedy 
such problems. Nonetheless, they are valuable, and can serve as the basis for theories and 
research in any number of directions. It would be both interesting and useful to know if there is a 
pattern to these gender differences, and if so, how we might characterize that pattern of 
difference and its causes. This kind of project is a psychological one, and while it interests me 
greatly, my purpose in this project is to understand the nature of philosophical concepts and 
disputes. Thus, I will unfortunately have to turn away from more socially relevant questions 
(though I will return in Chapter Five), and turn toward more abstract, philosophical ones. What is 
it about the philosophical vignettes discussed in this chapter and the last that leave so much 
undetermined that facts about the persons considering those vignettes can consistently play a role 
in the way they assess those vignettes?  
One possibility, as I have suggested, is chance, whose influence grows with the kinds of 
repeated observations used by Buckwalter and Stich. Ruling out chance is the first step toward 
developing an alternative theory. To mitigate the role of chance, it is important to narrow the 
scope of our questioning, and this is part of why I will focus more narrowly in the rest of this 
project on issues relating to determinism, free will, and moral responsibility.  In particular, I 
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examine the factors that lead people either to embrace or to reject the philosophical thesis that 
causal determinism is compatible with free will and with moral responsibility. 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 56 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCEPTUAL CONVERGENCE 
 
With our pre-scientific concepts we are very much in the position of our 
archaeologist in regard to the ontological problem. We have, so to speak, 
forgotten what features in the world of experience caused us to frame those 
concepts, and we have great difficulty in calling to mind the world of experience 
without the spectacles of the old-established conceptual interpretation. There is 
the further difficulty that our language is compelled to work with words which are 
inseparably connected with those primitive concepts.  
-Albert Einstein, “The Problem of Space, Ether, and the Field in Physics” 
 
The positive project of experimental philosophy usually aims to replace the question of what 
people should believe with one about what people do believe and, in its most extreme form, to 
reduce the former to the latter. My proposal here has been to shift focus onto a question that I 
think is more fundamental than, and crucial to, all three of these projects: Why do people 
disagree about the answers to philosophical questions?   
Many answers have been proposed, and my suggestion is that there in fact are many 
answers, depending on what kind of philosophical question is being asked. My proposal is to 
deemphasize the central question of what people should believe, and focus instead on why they 
believe it. To resolve disagreements, it might not be best to ask why we disagree about all 
philosophical problems, nor to only ask about the causes of disagreement over one problem at a 
time. Instead, I have suggested that we develop a taxonomy that lets us understand the type of 
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issues at stake. Then, once we know what kind of disagreement something is, we can better draw 
on our understanding of that type of disagreement to better develop and test hypotheses about 
how to resolve them. 
I think that one way to more effectively adjudicate philosophical disputes (when it is 
possible to do so) is simply for interlocutors to ask each other the right questions to establish the 
rules of the game. My project aims to identify the fault lines in disagreement. In this chapter, I 
model judgments of moral responsibility and free will that were collected in an experiment, in 
order to identify a relationship between two philosophical concepts that, I argue, was not 
previously understood. 
In this chapter, I use this approach to argue that free will is a nominal construct 
developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to provide cohesive narratives in support of a priori 
moral-judgmental dispositions. In a reversal of traditional course, I defend the view that there are 
no circumstances under which attributions of moral responsibility for an act can, should, or do 
depend on prior ascriptions of free will. Conversely, I claim that free will belief depends entirely 
on the apperceived possibility of moral responsibility. Orthodoxy dictates an agency-first thesis, 
according to which free will is necessarily antecedent to moral responsibility. However, I present 
a number of arguments against this view, and in favor of an agency-last stance, according to 
which the concept of free will is dependent upon that of moral responsibility.  
 I provide further support for my case in the form of new empirical evidence regarding the 
stable mode of inference used to attribute free will across moral contexts. These experimental 
results can be interpreted to imply the deflation of one of the longest-standing veridical 
paradoxes in experimental philosophy. Furthermore, the sole conceptual scheme found to be 
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capable of modeling the experimental results is also capable of illuminating several classic works 
in the analytic philosophy of moral agency. 
 
4.1. A Puzzle of Moral-Agentive Cognition 
 
On February 17th, 2004, the state of Texas administered a lethal injection to Cameron Todd 
Willingham for pouring gasoline all over his home, blocking the exit with a refrigerator, and 
setting fire to the house while his three daughters slept inside. Multiple investigators reported 
evidence of “mineral spirits” and “puddle patterns all over the place” from lighter fluid, which 
led from under the girls’ beds to the front door of the house. Willingham’s own lawyer has since 
said that over twenty pieces of “evidence showed that he was one hundred percent guilty” 
(Grann, 2009). One neighbor testified that as the fire blazed, Willingham calmly moved his car 
down his driveway to keep it away from the flames, and waited until the authorities arrived to 
“put on a show,” purportedly feigning a level of emotion that led a police chaplain to conclude 
that Willingham “was in complete control.” Supposing that these events were the inevitable 
result of natural laws, the invariable unwinding of a clockwork universe—that they took place in 
a universe that adheres to the philosophical thesis of causal determinism—might we have to 
relinquish the thought that Willingham really was in control of his behavior, that he even had the 
choice to behave otherwise? 
The variance of philosophical beliefs is evident not only in interpersonal disagreements, 
but also in apparent contradictions of belief within a single subject. In theory, the sources of this 
within-subjects variance are manifold. In practice, one source of this apparent affinity to self-
contradiction is order effects. Order effects are divergent responses to a single prompt, 
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depending on whether or not certain other philosophical questions were posed before it. Order 
effects seem to affect the beliefs of philosophy professors as much as, if not more than, the 
judgments of professors who are not philosophers (Schwitzgebel and Cushman, 2012). 
Moreover, it is not just that professional philosophers are as prone to these influences everyone 
else—philosophers who claim expertise about a particular subject are apparently just as likely to 
fall prey to these effects as anyone else is (Schwitzgebel, 2014). In the this chapter, I return to 
the idea that it is not individuals’ views we need to question as a result of observed covariance 
with individual difference factors, but what the underlying theories themselves have to tell us. 
 
4.2. Motivating the Concept of Agency & the Concept of Motivated Agency 
 
Why do philosophers care about free will? The impetus to preserve or willingness to forgo a 
viable notion of agency is generally motivated by a priori attitudes toward the need to maintain 
or ability to do without a robust concept of moral responsibility. But this only shifts our inquiry 
to an analogous one about why people care about moral responsibility. This shift suggests that 
moral responsibility may be a more fundamental concept than free will, which in turn raises 
important new research questions for metaphilosophy and moral psychology. 
Normally, people assume that moral responsibility presupposes agency, but that picture 
may be perfectly backwards. Instead of facilitating meaningful blame and praise, free will may 
only be an instrument of blame and praise, a secondary and inessential construct through which 
we rationalize immediate dispositions to seek retribution and yield to obligation. This is roughly 
the opposite of what I have been taught, and I initially found the idea nearly impossible to fully 
wrap my head around. Nonetheless, I have found this perspective to yield a great deal of 
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explanatory power. If we consider that free will may only be a vestigial heuristic for explaining 
moral responsibility in the absence of more sophisticated neuropsychosocial explanations—
rather than a necessary condition for formally establishing moral responsibility—then it becomes 
unclear if the existence of free will is relevant to moral inquiry at all. 
 
4.2.1. Topical and Methodological Purview 
 
In §4.3, I discuss a widely studied puzzle of moral-agentive cognition,10 which I use as a window 
into the current moral psychological landscape. Against this backdrop, I contrast my own views 
on moral-agentive judgment in practice (psychological questions) and in theory (philosophical 
questions). I identify in §4.4. a number of matters arising from previous attempts to understand 
the puzzle, and offer a way to circumvent the logical inconsistencies encountered on the 
approaches traditionally taken by philosophers and psychologists. I do so by proposing a change 
in perspective, which I more fully outline and compare to its theoretic competitors in §4.5.. In 
§4.6., I take a decidedly empirical turn, in order to test the predictive accuracy and relative fit of 
each theoretical paradigm11 of explanation. In that section, I operationalize the proposed new 
                                                            
10 By moral-agentive cognition, I mean the processes through which the moral agency of others 
is evaluated. I deliberately use the opaque term ‘moral agency’ and its conjugates in all 
propositions that refer ambiguously to moral responsibility and free will, but which fail to 
distinguish between the two. My reasoning for employing this uncommon catchall is to flag and 
avoid the potential pitfalls addressed in §4.5. 
11 I use the term ‘paradigm’ in the fourth sense listed in the Oxford English Dictionary: “A 
conceptual or methodological model underlying the theories and practices of a science or 
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approach, as well as its theoretic competitors, as predictive models of moral-agentive cognition, 
and test each of these models against experimental data of ordinary philosophical judgments. The 
discussion of these results, which constitutes §4.7., serves to explain of how the model I defend 
can reduce to triviality several psychological pseudoproblems arising from the purportedly 
“paradoxical” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008) nature of ordinary beliefs about moral responsibility 
and free will. 
Finally, I discuss in §4.8. how the prima facie renegade theory I defend is in fact 
anything but the radical departure from tradition that it may at first appear to be. On the contrary, 
the agency-last paradigm I embrace is uniquely capable of providing a unified philosophical 
perspective from which we can more easily develop a coherent picture of several of the most 
prominent metaethical arguments in 20th century philosophy. Rather than debating whether or 
not free will exists, my interest here is in considering the question of whether, from a strictly 
moral perspective, free will matters. My thesis is that regardless of whether or not free will 
exists, its existence—something about which we can neither have certain knowledge nor certain 
doubt, and which we could never come to know through experience (Kant, 1785/1998)—may be 
largely irrelevant to the domain of moral inquiry, the domain with which most people who 
entertain questions of agency are primarily concerned.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
discipline” (2014). I reserve the word ‘model’ for discussions of statistical tests of observed 
moral-agentive attributions, which I analyze with a technique called structural equation 
modeling (Kline, 2011). 
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4.3. A Puzzle of Moral-Agentive Cognition 
 
Why do we tend to view others as autonomous agents—as endowed with the freedom of choice 
(Nahmias 2006), as behaving intentionally (Knobe, 2004), and as possessed of causal powers 
(Alicke, Rose, and Bloom, 2011)—in proportion to the extent to which they have ‘done wrong’? 
With greater moral transgressions comes greater—or at least more certain—moral responsibility. 
This stands to reason, as the responsibility one shoulders by killing thousands in cold blood far 
exceeds the moral burden undertaken by lighting up a joint or smoking a cigarette in a no-
smoking zone. But does it also stand to reason that greater moral transgressions are indicative of 
greater levels of volition, deliberation, and instrumentality?  
 
4.3.1. Type and Token Thought Experiments 
 
Consider a deterministic universe, in which… 
 
…scientists figure out the exact state the universe was in at the time of the big bang, and 
figure out all the laws of physics as well. They put this information into a supercomputer, 
and the computer perfectly predicts everything that has ever happened and ever will 
happen. In other words, these scientists prove that everything that happens has to happen 
exactly that way because of the laws of physics and everything that's come before. 
 
Now, suppose that in such a universe… 
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…someone commits a crime. 
 
With both these premises in mind, consider two questions: 
 
Was this person free to choose12 whether or not to commit this crime?  
 
How morally responsible is this person for committing this crime? 
 
Next, consider a second scenario, adapted from the actual case of Cameron Todd 
Willingham, the triple-murder-arson suspect who ultimately received the death penalty for the 
crimes of which he was accused (Grann, 2009). Suppose that in this same deterministic 
universe… 
 
…a man named Todd has taken to abusing his daughters. In order to cover up this 
abuse, he pours gasoline all over his home one morning while his wife is out 
shopping, lights the house on fire, and successfully murders his daughters while 
remaining unharmed himself.  
 
Here, we can ask: 
 
                                                            
12 Throughout this chapter, I treat ‘free will’ and ‘free choice’ as interchangeable. If this gives 
the reader the impression that I (or the participants in the experiment) do not know how one is 
supposed to use the term ‘free will,’ then the reader is beginning to get my point.  
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Was Todd free to choose whether or not to commit this crime?  
 
How morally responsible is Todd for committing this crime? 
 
4.3.2. The Source of the Puzzlement 
 
Even when asked to assume determinism, people are more likely to make attributions of13 moral 
responsibility (‘MR’) (Nichols and Knobe, 2007) and of free will (‘FW’) (Nahmias, Morris, 
Nadelhoffer and Turner, 2005) to agents who have committed more severe moral transgressions. 
Especially puzzling is the fact that for some types of act (e.g., crimes), most people tend to deny 
MR and FW, yet they usually assert MR and FW for certain token acts of those very same types 
(e.g., Todd’s criminal infanticide). Previous researchers have generally defended one of two 
interpretations of the effects of the affective, concrete, or morally transgressive nature of an act 
(‘ACT’) on attributions of moral agency. 
 
4.4. Normative and Deflationist Accounts of the Puzzle 
 
What do people really believe about the compatibility of free will and causal determinism, and 
                                                            
13 I use MR, FW, and ACT to refer to the psychological constructs, rooted in personal perception, 
of which participant ratings are an indicator. In light of recent evidence and arguments for 
‘interpretive diversity’ (Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007), I think it is important to distinguish these 
constructs from the potentially mind-independent, objective, real phenomena with which 
philosophers are typically concerned.  
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are their beliefs contradictory? Historically, experimental philosophers have adopted what I will 
call the normative approach, taking results like these to show that concrete, affect-laden details 
can bias attributions of moral agency (as mentioned in §2.2.1.). Because these normative 
theorists believe that these results reveal a logical contradiction in ordinary attributions of moral 
agency across contexts, many researchers have taken such studies as evidence of a kind of 
“abstract/concrete paradox” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). From this point of departure, these 
researchers have sought to develop error theories.14 Error theories are characterizations of the 
situational factors that select for faulty processing and attribution of moral agency (Leslie, 
Knobe, and Cohen, 2006), and of the cognitive processes that lead to these errant judgments. But 
there is a rift between error theorists who think that ACT inhibits the production of competent, 
accurate attributions of moral agency, and those who believe that it actually facilitates accurate 
moral-agentive attribution. 
One camp of normative theorists, perhaps guided by their own a priori commitment to 
the philosophical thesis that genuine moral agency is incompatible with determinism, insists that 
the intrusive presence of certain details leads people to erroneously attribute inflated levels of 
moral responsibility and free will. These expressed opinions, they argue, actually belie people’s 
true, “naturally incompatibilist” beliefs (Kane, 1999). Members of the other camp, who are 
sometimes motivated by an overt interest in promoting the belief that moral agency is compatible 
with moral responsibility and free will (Vohs and Schooler, 2008), argue instead that it is the 
                                                            
14 One exception to this rule is the Norm Broken, Agent Responsible (NBAR) theory (Ripley and 
Mandelbaum, 2012), which focuses on transgressions rather than emotion/cognition or 
abstract/concrete distinctions. Most of my criticisms do not apply to these sorts of value-neutral 
approaches, and I think that projects like these may be particularly informative.  
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absence of affective details that biases people, causing them to mistakenly mitigate the levels of 
moral responsibility and free will they assign in the presence of deterministic factors. 
Opposed to the normative approach is the deflationist approach noted in §2.2.1.,15 which 
is typically defended by skeptics about experimental philosophy. Such skeptics believe that 
experimental philosophy has nothing to contribute to philosophy as traditionally construed, and 
that empirical approaches can only reveal the unstable “folk intuitions” (Kauppinen, 2007) of 
philosophical novices who have been confronted with stripped down cases and denied sufficient 
time or resources to adequately reflect on them. While normative theorists find results like those 
discussed to be interesting and surprising, deflationists raise doubts about the philosophical 
import of such findings (Cappelen, 2012), and about the broader, potentially insidious 
assumption that “intuitions are likely to be reliable and should form the building blocks for 
sound moral judgments” (Sunstein, 2005). From a skeptical, if somewhat reductive perspective, 
such findings might be seen as nothing more than specific examples of the general principle that 
upsetting events influence ordinary judgments. If concrete, affective details only influence 
ordinary attributions of moral agency through domain-general processes—that is, through 
processes capable of biasing all sorts of cognition, not just moral-agentive cognition—then the 
effects of ACT on MR and FW might not be of any uniquely moral or philosophical significance.  
                                                            
15 It would be misleading to contrast deflationists directly with error theorists. Many (and I 
suspect most) deflationists believe that philosophical questions have objectively correct and 
incorrect answers. On this view, competent and errant responses might be thought to correspond 
directly to these correct and incorrect answers, respectively. The primary difference between 
(realist) deflationists and normative theorists, then, is only the philosophical import each attaches 
to her preferred error theory. 
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4.4.1. Shortcomings of the Normative and Deflationist Approaches 
 
But neither the normative nor the deflationist approach is entirely well-founded, and both 
interpretations impugn the so-called “folk intuitions” of outsiders to the analytic philosophy 
community without sufficient justification for doing so. Each approach purports to tell us what to 
make of the variance in harshness and leniency with which people make moral-agentive 
attributions in different situations. But it does not follow from the fact that in different situations 
people tend to respond differently (more or less harshly or leniently) in their moral-agentive 
attributions, that in some of these situations they tend to respond differently than they should (too 
harshly or leniently). To claim that instability in the application of agentive concepts across cases 
can properly be characterized as logical inconsistency in those concepts’ application is to make 
two unwarranted assumptions. 
First, there seems to be no way of deciding which of these two ostensibly inconsistent 
applications is errant, other than by reference to one’s own a priori attitudes toward the 
compatibility or incompatibility of moral agency with causal determinism; the ‘error theory’ to 
which a researcher subscribes will inevitably be biased by her own philosophical beliefs. The 
reason for this is straightforward. The assertion that a person has responded differently than she 
should have implies certain propositions about the range of responses she could have given 
which would have been more acceptable. But these propositions amount to little more than 
claims about whether or not full causal determinism may be the sole factor that decides moral 
agency, even in the presence of other moral and agentive factors. As such, any theory premised 
on an assertion of inconsistency (as opposed to mere instability) would have to presuppose the 
very same highly contentious philosophical framework it sought to crown as the one most people 
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really believe—either compatibilism, or incompatibilism.  
As an illustrative example, imagine that an empirical scientist wishes only to defend a 
‘psychological reading’ of one of these error theories, which only describes behavior and the 
component processes leading to it. This scientist, we can assume, wishes to eschew anything that 
might be construed as a ‘philosophical reading,’ a reading that extends interpretation to the 
metaphysical or normative-ethical domains. In other words, she intends only to describe the 
processes by which people arrive at different philosophical conclusions in different cases, and to 
indicate the goal-directed success or unsuccess of those processes in each case. Still, her error 
theory must characterize certain practical judgments as either representative or non-
representative of subjects’ competent, unbiased beliefs, and therefore as resulting from cognitive 
processes taking place under ideal (controlled) or non-ideal (confounding) conditions. But 
characterizations of this latter kind require her to embrace some set of a priori views toward the 
relevance or irrelevance of certain ACT details to competent, unbiased moral-agentive judgment. 
Such views are tantamount to a priori assumptions about the normativity or deviancy of the 
circumstances under which these acts are committed, and in which these moral-agentive 
assessments are made. From this, it follows that some of our researcher’s a priori assumptions 
will have to be ones about the moral normativity or deviancy of the acts committed and judged. 
Second, in taking the instability of moral-agentive ascriptions across situations to be 
logically inconsistent, researchers usually attribute these supposed mistakes to the presence or 
absence of emotional or affective processes. But the tacit assumption that the key factor is 
affective or other processes per se, rather than the component of affect (or other aspects of 
mentation) central to and perhaps even constitutive of (Prinz, 2007) judgments of moral agency, 
is unwarranted. If it turns out that the details of a moral transgression (or the way in which that 
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transgression is presented) affects either MR or FW in a way that is essentially indirect—that is, 
which only occurs due to some causal link between MR and FW—then studying these indirect 
effects could reveal fundamental facts about the conditional relationship between the ordinary 
language concepts of moral responsibility and free will. Such findings could reveal attributions 
of free will to be largely inert in the initial assignment of moral culpability. If this were true, we 
would have reason to doubt that agentive ascriptions are anything more than moral honorifics 
rendered ex post facto. 
 
4.4.2 The Need for A New Approach 
 
Ultimately, the philosophical project of deciding which moral-agentive evaluations are 
appropriate in a given situation is inseparable from the project of deciding whether a given 
situation is conducive to making appropriate moral-agentive evaluations. In order to develop any 
error theory, a researcher must make a priori assumptions about the liberty or illiberty of agents, 
and about the moral normativity or deviancy of acts committed and judged. The unjustified and, 
I have argued, seemingly false presuppositions made by both kinds of error theories necessitates 
an alternative explanation of the effects of ACT on moral-agentive cognition. This demands that 
we shift our research focus away from trying to decide which judgments of moral agency are 
right and which are wrong, and turn instead to a new set of questions about the relationship 
between agency and moral responsibility.  
The relationship between moral responsibility and free will is usually taken to be analytic 
(that is, true by definition), so focusing on the nature of the logical connection between these 
concepts is not only useful from a philosophical perspective, but might also help us develop and 
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test a psychological model of judgments of moral responsibility and free will. This, in turn, 
might tell us something about the analytic interdependence of these two philosophical concepts. 
Rather than inquire as to the individual differences that underwrite moral and philosophical 
disagreement and misunderstanding as in Chapter Two (Holtzman, 2013), my purpose here is to 
explore an even more perplexing question. This is the question of whether we first assess free 
will, and on the basis of this information build our understanding of an agent’s moral 
responsibility, or if we first make attributions of moral responsibility, and only later construct 
agentive narratives on the basis of these attributions.  
 
4.5. Paradigms of Moral-Agentive Relata 
 
What are the common conceptual schemata that allow us to coherently debate and discuss such 
opaque phenomena as liberty, willfulness, and agency? Here, I begin to address the focal 
problem of how it is possible to infer moral responsibility and free will from ordinary 
observations of behavior. In particular, I am interested in what causes (or allows) people to draw 
these inferences even when they assume causal determinism (one version of which I have laid 
out in §4.3.).  
The thesis that causal determinism is compatible with free will is, for reasons that may be 
obvious, referred to by philosophers and psychologists as compatibilism; and the thesis that the 
two are not compatible is called incompatibilism. For reasons that may be equally obvious, the 
thesis that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility is also referred to as 
compatibilism, and the thesis that the two are not compatible is called incompatibilism. But as 
illustrated by way of parable in Frankfurt (1969), and explicitly elucidated by Fischer (1982), 
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compatibilism and incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility are 
distinct from compatibilism and incompatibilism about causal determinism and free will. 
In coining the terms compatibilism and incompatibilism (which arose in §2 and in 
§3.2.4.), Slote (1969) intended them to refer to only the theses that we might call agentive 
compatibilism and agentive incompatibilism. For Slote, these were views about free will, which 
did depend on “one’s evaluation of certain moral issues,” but also on a number of other factors, 
including “the force and significance of certain similes, analogies, and diagrams.” They are 
broader versions of the compatibilist theory that William James (1884) called soft determinism, 
and the incompatibilist position he dubbed hard determinism, more inclusive because they do not 
require the assumption that determinism is true (an assumption which, it just so happens, James 
rejected). But in time, Slote’s words have replaced Strawson’s (1963) optimism and pessimism 
and begun to lead a double-life, moonlighting as shorthand for moral compatibilism and moral 
incompatibilism while keeping their jobs as monikers for agentive compatibilism and agentive 
incompatibilism. It should be clear, then, that any thoroughgoing understanding of “Folk 
Intuitions About Moral Responsibility and Free Will” (Nahmias et al., 2005) must recognize the 
distinction and relationship between these two kinds of compatibilist thesis—ones concerning 
free will, and ones concerning moral responsibility.16 This recognition naturally requires us to 
understand the distinction and relationship between free will and moral responsibility. The 
                                                            
16 It should be acknowledged that Nahmias et al.’s 2005 paper, contemporary reactions to which 
kicked off the experimentalist debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists, did in fact 
measure both constructs. It may be due in part to the unfortunate similarity in ratings of MR and 
FW for the particular cases tested by Nahmias and his colleagues that researchers have since 
begun to assume that the two types of attribution are more-or-less identical. 
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purpose of this section is to develop that understanding. 
 
4.5.1. The Identity Paradigm 
 
In their watershed paper, “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of 
Folk Intuitions,” Nichols and Knobe warn that “one might maintain that determinism is 
compatible with moral responsibility but not with free will” (2007). But with rare exception (e.g., 
Feltz, 2013), it has become status quo for psychologists and philosophers to treat ‘free will’ as 
synonymous with ‘moral responsibility’ (e.g., Baumeister, 2008; Paulhus and Carey, 2011 Rose 
and Nichols, 2013; Feltz and Cokely, 2008;). While this identity paradigm may be expedient for 
communicating research to the public in the sexiest way possible, it makes a mess out of some of 
the best-known metaphysical arguments of the last fifty years. The issue is not merely that the 
identity paradigm stands in contrast to certain philosophical positions that some of us might like 
to defend; the issue is that the paradigm itself renders entire debates, and every contrasting 
position within those debates, utterly incoherent.  
Fischer’s semicompatibilism, developed from the premise that we can “separate 
compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility from compatibilism about 
causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise” (1987), would be far less influential if he had 
endeavored on the identity-paradigmatic project of trying to separate compatibilism about moral 
responsibility from, well, compatibilism about moral responsibility. Van Inwagen’s assertion that 
we possess “the free will required for moral responsibility” would be a fallacious case of 
affirming the consequent, were we to think of him as arguing that people have the moral 
responsibility required for moral responsibility (1983). And Pereboom’s denial of “whatever sort 
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of freedom is sufficient for moral responsibility” (2001) would read as miserably circular to 
believers in free will, if all he really was denying was the sort of free will sufficient for free will.  
Philosophers have done an excellent job of identifying the ways in which moral 
responsibility and free will are theoretically orthogonal. As experimentalists work to identify the 
ways in which attributions of these concepts are made, it is important not to lose sight of their 
theoretical distinction, as this distinction could be expected to dictate their use in practice. Any 
satisfactory account of moral agency or the attribution thereof should recognize this distinction. 
Therefore, one of three possible non-identity accounts can be expected to provide greater insight 
than the identity paradigm. 
 
4.5.2. The Common Causes Paradigm 
 
One possibility is that attributions of free will and moral responsibility are independent and 
immediate responses to certain kinds of perceived acts. On this view, their covariance (or 
tendency to co-occur) belies their common dependence on some third variable or set of variables. 
The puzzle at hand suggests that the culprit, should this view be correct, is their shared ancestry 
in the affective, concrete, or morally transgressive nature of an act. Within this common causes 
paradigm (Figure 10a), MR and FW are not conditional on one another. Unfortunately, this 
approach raises a glaring question: If moral responsibility and free will are not causally linked, 
why should affective, concrete, and moral factors influence judgments of free will?  
 The common causes paradigm demands an independent path for this influence, but it is 
not clear why we should expect such a path to exist. It seems reasonable that a person’s moral 
responsibility at some time T2 depends on just what she has done at some earlier time T1, but it 
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does not seem possible that the free will an agent possesses at some earlier time T0 could depend 
on what she has not done and will not do until some later time T1. The common causes paradigm, 
it can be seen, unyokes moral responsibility and free will too much. 
 
 
Figure 10. Three competing paradigms of moral-agentive entailment relations. (A) The common 
causes paradigm takes the correlation between MR and FW to be a spurious “third variable” 
phenomenon. (B) The agency-first paradigm assumes that free will is assessed prior to judgment 
of moral responsibility, and therefore can affect its assessment but not vice-versa. (C) The 
agency-last paradigm, advocated here, is based on the theory that judgments of moral 
responsibility are immediately influenced by the details of moral transgressions, and attributions 
of free will are essentially conditional on these earlier judgments of moral responsibility. 
	   
4.5.3. The Agency-First Paradigm 
 
Most philosophers have endorsed, at least implicitly, an agency-first paradigm (Figure 10b). 
This approach introduces a level of parsimony by treating MR and FW as serial rather than 
parallel judgments, which may be appropriate insofar as moral responsibility and free will are 
serial phenomena. By definition, an agent’s free will at some time T0 can only play a causal role 
in an event which occurs at some later time T1, and she cannot be morally responsible for the 
Agency-First Agency-LastCommon Causes
A B C
ACT ACT ACT
MR MRMR
FW FWFW
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consequences of that event until some even later time T2, once those consequences have 
manifest. In keeping with this sequence of events, the agency-first paradigm contends that the 
association between attributions of moral responsibility and of free will is due to a conditional 
relationship thought to hold between them: To whatever extent ACT informs FW, a portion of 
these effects will be indirectly transmitted to MR via their influence on FW. Because this sort of 
conditional process in moral-agentive cognition is perceived by many to be a desirable reflection 
of the relationship between the metaphysical concepts of moral responsibility and free will, it is 
the relationship most commonly assumed by social scientists (Baumeister, 2008) and 
philosophers (Dennett, 1984) to hold between MR and FW. But this assumption is based on 
fallacious reasoning. 
Belief in the priority of agency over responsibility is driven primarily by commitment to 
a widely-held dogma regarding temporal priority, not logical antecedence. This dogma dictates 
that an agent must freely choose to commit an act prior to its occurrence, and therefore prior to 
being responsible for its occurrence, in order to be morally responsible for that act. While this 
may be true, logical priority and temporal priority are two very different matters, and in the case 
of necessary preconditions, the arrow of time and the arrow of entailment will always head in 
opposite directions. To say that moral responsibility must follow free will is to say that free will 
must follow from moral responsibility. Therefore, the fact that a person must freely choose to 
commit an act before she can be morally responsible for its consequences does not license us to 
infer moral responsibility from free choice; instead, the fact that a person is morally responsible 
licenses us to infer that she has acted freely. Philosophers who wish to maintain that free will is a 
necessary precondition for moral responsibility are therefore in no position to defend the agency-
first paradigm. 
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4.5.4. The Agency-Last Paradigm 
 
On the contrary, philosophers have unwittingly developed a conception of moral responsibility 
and free will that implies an agency-last paradigm (Figure 10c). The potential philosophical 
implications of the suggestion I have just made are not insignificant. The concept of moral 
responsibility plays, at the very least, an important causal role in individual and group behavior. 
For this reason, even those who believe it to be little more than an instrumental construct have 
reason to pay it heed, in the interests of social regulation and social explanation. Free will is also 
thought to play a role in social cognition, in substantiating attributions of moral responsibility. 
But the agency-last paradigm suggests that whatever roles free will might play in social 
cognition, establishing moral responsibility from the get-go is not one of them. If so, its 
deployment ex post facto as a source of moral justification can only underwrite circular 
arguments.  
 
4.5.5. From Psychological Models to Conceptual Paradigms 
 
Traditionalist readers, who might be expected to embrace the agency-first paradigm and perhaps 
also to eschew metaethical naturalism (see Prinz, in preparation), may at this point be 
unimpressed by the claims I have just made about inference. In fact, some readers sympathetic to 
my views will have recognized that inferential priority is not the same thing as logical priority. 
But because people generally take the relationship between free will and moral responsibility to 
be analytic—and in particular, because philosophers who care about free will justify their interest 
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on the basis of their analytic relationship—inferences about moral agency are strictly logical 
ones.  
In the substantive sense in which many philosophers aspire to speak about free will, a 
person cannot, ex post facto, choose past courses of actions for which she is already morally 
responsible, anymore than she might foresee past events for which others were morally 
responsible. Conversely, a person can only be known by others to have partaken in some event of 
her own free will ex post facto, just as foresight can only be confidently attributed in retrospect. 
Thus, the assumption that free will can be established independently from moral responsibility is 
based on a gross misunderstanding of the basic logic of moral causation. Philosophers who wish 
to maintain that free will is a necessary precondition for moral responsibility are therefore the 
last people who should want to defend the agency-first paradigm.  
If free will has no empirical correlates in daily life, no explanatory role in theory, and no 
instrumental value in social cognition, then it is unclear why we should concern ourselves with 
that concept at all. The purpose of the next section is to test the hypothesis that attributions of 
free will are secondary to judgments of moral responsibility, and do not play an essential role in 
the understanding or regulation of normative judgment. 
 
4.6. Experiment 
 
From where do we derive the apperception of free choice? Here, my goal is to show that the 
variance in FW across moral transgressions can be accounted for entirely by the variance in MR 
across those transgressions. I also hypothesize that, conversely, the variance in FW fails to 
explain a significant amount of the variance in MR across cases. Together, these two findings 
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would show that MR and FW are distinct, yet not entirely independent judgments. Moreover, 
such findings would demonstrate that the influence of ACT on FW can be understood entirely in 
terms of moral considerations of a transgression, so long as we accept the view that free will falls 
out of—rather than factors into—moral responsibility. To test the predictive accuracy and 
relative fit of each paradigm, undergraduates were recruited to participate in an experiment.   
 
4.6.1. Participants 
 
Participants were selected from introductory philosophy classes in the university-wide required 
core curriculum at Brooklyn College, and were told that participation would not affect their 
course grades. Responses were delivered with no identifying information, and pen-and-paper 
surveys were proctored by a professor who was not their instructor, in order to preclude any form 
of actual or perceived coercion. All instructors of classes from which participants were recruited 
indicated that free will, moral responsibility, determinism, and compatibilism had not yet been 
addressed in their courses. All students who passed a comprehension check17 and filled out every 
response of interest were included in the analysis (n = 228). Of these, 42% were female; 5.3% 
over age 30; 46% White, 19% Asian, 17% Hispanic or Latino, 10% Black, and 8% Other or = 
                                                            
17 After reading about a deterministic world, participants were asked whether our world is 
subject to the very same deterministic principles. Participants who responded ‘Yes’ to this 
question, and who also indicated that the agent in the vignette was ‘Not at all responsible,’ were 
excluded from all analyses. Presumably, these participants (a) did not understand the task, (b) did 
not take the task seriously, or (c) rejected the very concept of moral responsibility a priori, 
regardless of the (as-yet unread) case at hand. 
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4.6.2. Methods and Materials 
 
First, participants were asked to imagine the deterministic universe described in §4.3. To check 
that between-group differences in MR and FW were due to the experimental manipulation rather 
than a priori differences in willingness or ability to assume a deterministic universe, participants 
were asked whether they thought that our own world is deterministic in a way similar to the 
world they read about. Overall, 17.5% of participants indicated that our own world is 
deterministic in the same way as the world described in the vignette. There was no significant 
difference in rate of a priori determinism between groups (t226 = .347, p = .729). 
Next, participants were presented with one of the two crime vignettes described in §4.3.18 
Participants were then asked to indicate whether or not the agent freely choose to commit his 
crime, and were then prompted to rate the agent’s level of moral responsibility on a Likert-type 
scale from 1 (“Not at all responsible”) to 7 (“Absolutely responsible”). These procedures again 
used the materials presented in §4.3. FW was always collected first, in order to increase the 
likelihood that participants would evaluate free will before considering moral responsibility, 
thereby increasing the probability that the proposed agency-last model would be rejected.  
  
4.6.3. Results  
 
Replication. Initial tests successfully replicated previous findings in the literature. As in these 
earlier studies, there was a significant relationship between the vignettes participants read, and 
the levels of moral responsibility they assigned (t226 = 9.64, p < .001). Participants who read 
                                                            
18 Vignette materials are presented verbatim, in offset, italicized text in §4.3.1.    
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about the gruesome triple-murder-arson tended to view its perpetrator as much more morally 
responsible for his actions (M114 = 6.535, SE = .116) than participants who were asked to judge a 
generic criminal (M114 = 4.404, SE = .188). Participants who read of this more heinous crime 
also demonstrated significantly higher odds (OR = 2.74) of accusing its perpetrator of freely 
choosing to commit his crime (χ21 = 10.058, p < .005).  
 
Differentiation. Further analyses supported the hypothesis that moral responsibility and free will 
were treated as distinct concepts (Figure 11). When participants were collapsed across 
experimental conditions, there was a medium-sized (Cohen, 1988) correlation between MR and 
FW (r = .445, p < .001). But as anticipated, the relationship between these ascriptions was 
moderated by the vignette participants read, F1, 224 = 6.313, p < .05. Although their correlation 
was medium-sized among participants who read about the child-killer (r = .486, p < .001), it was 
small for those who read about a generic criminal (r = .247, p < .01). 
 
Mediation. A path analysis (Hayes, 2013) was then conducted to test the hypothesis that MR 
mediated the effect of ACT on FW.19 This prediction was supported by the finding that there 
remained no significant main effect of ACT on FW (Figure 2). To rule out possible mediation in 
the other direction, a second path analysis was conducted against the more traditional view that 
FW mediated the effect of ACT on MR. This analysis found no evidence of agency-first 
mediation. As predicted, the direct effect of ACT on MR remained significant (z = 9.01, p < .001) 
even after accounting for potential indirect effects of ACT on MR (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
                                                            
19 Coefficients of dichotomous and continuous variables were made comparable by the method 
first recommended by MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993), and expanded upon by Hayes (2009). 
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Figure 11. Parameter estimation. Differences in free will attribution between conditions were 
totally mediated by judgments of moral responsibility. After controlling for differences in MR, 
participants who read details of a grotesque arson actually made slightly less frequent 
attributions of free will than those who only read only of a generic crime, though this effect did 
not approach statistical significance (p = .463). 
 
Evaluation. Finally, fully-specified agency-first and agency-last models were tested, and were 
compared to one another and to a common causes model (Table 5). Only the agency-last model 
predicted a pattern of responses that did not differ significantly from the actual data collected 
(Likelihood-ratio χ2). That model was also the only one to provide an acceptably close absolute 
fit to the data after adjustments for parsimony were made to each model (RMSEA; Brown and 
Cudeck, 1993). Comparisons between models were then made with a parsimony-adjusted index 
of relative fit, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). These comparisons found that the 
agency-last model provided a better relative fit than either of the other two nested models, and 
was an even better fit than a just-identified model (Kline, 2011) in which all variables were 
correlated with one another (BIC = 1459.405). The agency-last model was also the only one to 
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provide an acceptable improvement in fit over a null model (CFI; Hu and Bentler, 1999). The 
common causes and agency-first models both left unacceptably large correlations between 
variables unexplained (SRMR), but on the agency-last model, less than 1% of the unaccounted 
for (residual covariance) between ACT and FW could have been due to a common factor. 
 
 Agency-First Common Causes Agency-Last 
χ2 69.403* 41.25* .538 (n.s.) 
RMSEA .548* .420* .000 (n.s.) 
BIC 
CFI  
1523.379 
.459 
1495.226 
.682 
1454.513 
1.0 
SRMR  
Residual covariance 
Note: * p < .001 
.150 
.443 
 
.112 
.285 
.012 
-.008 
Table 5. All fit statistics favored the agency-last model, and disfavored the common causes and 
agency-first models. χ2, RMSEA, and BIC are measure badness-of-fit, for which higher values 
indicate poorer fit (more unexplained covariance). For these measures, α levels indicate the 
probability that the model will correctly predict the responses of a randomly selected population 
sample. The comparative fit index (CFI) measures goodness-of-fit, with higher values indicating 
better fit between the model and the data. This measure reflects the marginal improvement in 
prediction each model provides over a model assuming a random distribution of responses. The 
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SRMR provides a measure of the mean absolute value of the unexplained covariance between 
each possible pair of variables, and the residual covariance measures the association between 
those two variables for which no path is specified on the model. 
 
4.7. Discussion 
 
How do people actually think about moral responsibility and free will? The experiment suggests 
two clear answers to this question. First, people generally conceive of moral responsibility and 
free will as related but decidedly different constructs. In the sample population, attributions of 
free will were much less susceptible to the influence of moral and emotional considerations than 
were judgments of moral responsibility. Put another way, the extent to which MR and FW came 
apart depended on differences in the acts under consideration. Because these two moral-agentive 
concepts diverged in this way, it can be inferred that they are not identical. Therefore, any 
account of how people employ either psychological construct cannot be successful without 
sufficiently distinguishing the two.  
 Second, judgments of free will across moral contexts appear to be driven primarily by 
evaluations of moral responsibility. No aspect of the acts with which participants were 
confronted, other than those acts’ tendencies to elicit attributions of greater or lesser moral 
responsibility, significantly affected beliefs about the freedom of choice exercised by their 
perpetrator. Importantly, this means that attributions of free will and moral responsibility came 
apart in precisely the way that an optimist about the ordinary ability to recognize and to 
distinguish between moral responsibility and free will might hope they would.  
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When modeled according to these two principles, ordinary attributions of free will did not 
appear to be significantly affected by any form of concrete or affective bias. This discovery 
stands in stark contrast to previous characterizations of these attributions as noisy and irrational. 
On the basis of these findings, I will now sketch a series of responses to the questions I set forth 
earlier. I expect that my account will be incomplete and not entirely precise. The discussion that 
follows is intended primarily as a framework within which to develop future research programs 
bridging conceptual analysis with the study of social cognition. 
 
4.7.1. From where do we derive the apperception of free choice? 
 
There appear to be at least two ways in which people become inclined to view others as 
possessed of the freedom of choice. The first route to attributions of agency may at first seem 
ineluctable: unless there is strong evidence to the contrary (and often despite strong evidence to 
the contrary), the free will of others may often be taken for granted. I will come back to this 
route in a moment. The second positive route is through the ascription or perception of moral 
responsibility. Other well-trod explanatory roads to agentive attribution, including ACT, may 
only be indirect tributaries to ascriptions of agency, contributing only as an indirect result of their 
more immediate connection to moral responsibility.  
To be clear, those who have wondered why ACT bears on FW have not been mistaken 
about the existence of such a relationship per se, but have failed to recognize the chain of 
influence through which this indirect effect is transmitted. A framework that recognizes this 
chain of influence is uniquely capable of supporting a psychologically and philosophically 
satisfying explanation of these conditional effects. ACT does not influence MR and FW so much 
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as it influences FW because and only because it influences MR. This chain of influence may be 
difficult to see because it contradicts the deeply-entrenched agency-first paradigm. The agency-
last paradigm remedies this error, and the reinterpretation of the data it makes possible should be 
seen as a victory by all those who believe that genuine philosophical concepts and their logical 
employ are accessible to most people. But how might we account for the tendency to default to 
the agentive assumption, even in non-moral contexts? 
 The agency-last paradigm, when more fully developed, may actually allow us to 
understand and study the seemingly ineluctable route to free will beliefs as well. For example, 
one might wonder about the extent to which freedom of choice plays a central role in cultural 
identity, and to which cultural identity informs beliefs about freedom of choice. In recent work, 
Prinz (in preparation) has noted that the tendency to automatically associate personhood with 
agency is very likely learned. If so, and if the agency-last hypothesis is correct, then it might be 
expected that socialized differences in moral responsibility norms should produce corresponding 
differences in free will belief. On the other hand, if moral responsibility presupposes free will, 
then fatalists should presumably partake of less retributivist forms of punishment, since only 
non-moral, practical concerns should guide their punitive decisions. To test this hypothesis, Prinz 
looked at the penal systems of the ten most fatalistic countries in the world (according to the 
World Values Survey; Minkov, 2012). Although less than one-third of all countries have retained 
capital punishment in law and practice, eight of the ten most fatalistic countries in the world 
today are retentionist states. While these findings border on anecdotal for the moment, they are 
suggestive of the kind of research impact that might be achieved in philosophy and psychology 
by flipping Kant on his head in the way suggested by the agency-last paradigm. 
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4.7.2. What are the common conceptual schemata that allow us to coherently debate and discuss 
such opaque phenomena as liberty, willfulness, and agency?  
 
It follows from the non-identity of the psychological constructs of MR and FW that the 
philosophical concepts of moral responsibility and free will, which those constructs are meant to 
serve, are also distinct. This must be true whether or not error theories are appropriate for 
characterizing the variance of MR and FW across moral contexts. If we are to sacrifice error 
theories, as I have suggested we should, then we are plainly are dealing with two different 
concepts. But even if the effects of ACT on MR and FW might properly be accounted for by 
some error theory, then the full set of processing errors each is prone to would have to be 
different. It follows from this that the core competencies underwriting each must also be 
different. Because core competencies by definition involve the ‘right’ use of concepts, 
deflationists and normative theorists alike are forced to acknowledge that philosophical concepts 
of free will and moral responsibility, and the psychological constructs that underwrite their 
attribution are, at their core, distinct. 
An objector might reply that the principles of deduction permit the inference of causes 
from their effects—or more precisely, the inference of necessary preconditions from the 
observation of phenomena that require the satisfaction of those conditions. One might therefore 
be tempted to think that the inference of FW from MR tells us nothing about the metaphysical 
relationship between moral responsibility and free will, or even about the priority of MR over 
FW in individuals’ conceptual schema. But the inference of a cause from its ostensible effects 
requires external evidence that the proposed cause exists. Without such evidence, theoretic 
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causes only play a nominal role in arguments that ultimately beg the questions they set out to 
answer. 
For example, the existence of our atmosphere can be validly deduced from the continued 
observation of lightning on Earth; but so can the existence of Thor, if we assume a priori that 
Thor exists. And not only the equations of Special Relativity, but also the supposed existence of 
a luminiferous ether, was “deduced from the phenomena of light” (Maxwell, 1878). But the 
latter, unlike the former, was unjustifiably premised on the apparently false (and inherently 
etheric) assumption that light always “must be somewhere, and supported by some material 
agency” (Poincaré, 1908). Likewise, the inference of free will from moral responsibility requires 
the further, unwarranted assumption that moral responsibility must be mediated by some 
metaphysical agency—that is, that that free will exists in the first place. 
Against the presupposition that there exists a material ether that mediates the 
transmission of light between distant bodies, John Stuart Mill once pointed out that “cases may 
be cited, even in our imperfect acquaintance with nature, where agencies that we have good 
reason to consider as radically distinct, produce their effects, or some of their effects, according 
to laws which are identical” (1868).  This same point can be applied to the presupposition that 
free will exists. Just as the revolution in physics at the turn of the 20th century eventually enabled 
a shift away from ethereal theories of luminescence, recent advances in neuropsychology, 
genetics, and other human sciences at the turn of the 21st century have begun to obviate the 
postulation of free will. 
 
4.7.3. What do people really believe about the compatibility of free will and causal determinism, 
and are their beliefs contradictory? 
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There is nothing it could mean to discover that most people are “natural” (as opposed to 
“unnatural”) compatibilists or incompatibilists. This is not just due to the fact that most people 
have never thought about compatibilism, or that they (like Strawson) “do not know what the 
thesis of determinism is” (1963), or that they (like I) do not know what free will is supposed to 
be. It due to the fact that any claim about whether or not most people are “natural compatibilists” 
will rest on an error theory, and this will in turn rest on theoretic assumptions about the 
philosophical significance of ACT details. Thus, any reading of the data that purports to discover 
what most people “naturally” believe can only telegraph what a particular researcher already 
believes. As such, any claim about what people really believe will rest on assumptions about the 
philosophical significance of certain facts. But the fitness of these facts to the principles of 
normative ethics, and their relevance to the metaphysics of causation, is beyond the scope of 
behavioral science, which can only account for their bearing on moral cognition in practice. 
Therefore, the dichotomy between a purely descriptive, ‘psychological’ error theory of moral-
agentive attribution, and an inherently evaluative, ‘philosophical’ error theory, is false. 
This insight is crucial in defusing the questions raised by previous philosophers who have 
asserted that “Abstract + Concrete = Paradox” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). The variance in 
ordinary attributions of moral agency across contexts is not indicative of any inherent 
contradiction or paradox in ordinary beliefs about moral agency and determinism. In the 
experiment discussed here, there was no direct effect of ACT on FW. This revelation implies that 
there is nothing special or mysterious about “abstract framing” or “affective vignettes” that 
causes different behaviors undertaken in the same deterministic circumstances to be more or less 
frequently viewed as freely chosen.  
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4.7.4. Why do we tend to view others as autonomous agents in proportion to the extent to which 
they have ‘done wrong’?  
 
Ordinary judgments of free will vary across moral contexts differ precisely because the 
philosophical concept of free will is derived from that of moral responsibility. Admittedly, the 
skeptic might be justified in taking the fickleness of ordinary moral-agentive attributions to lack 
philosophical significance. The problem with such a flippantly deflationist interpretation of the 
data presented here, however, is that these data do not speak to any such unreliability. To the 
contrary, the experiment discussed herein revealed attributions of free will to be highly reliable, 
and extremely predictable as an effect of moral responsibility attribution. If deflationists believe 
ordinary philosophical judgments to be so wildly unpredictable, so uninformed, and so 
unfounded, then they should be absolutely baffled by the regularity with which I have found 
ordinary people to use moral-agentive concepts. When statistically modeled as a moral construct 
arising from the notion of moral responsibility, there was nothing significantly unreliable about 
ordinary views regarding free will, and its compatibility with determinism. The consistency with 
which moral responsibility guides judgments of free will across contexts is striking, and its 
implications for analytic philosophy should not be overlooked and cannot be dismissed. 
Philosophers may claim that what people believe about moral agency is none of their 
business, as philosophers. Nonetheless, how people come to have these philosophical beliefs 
(moral epistemology), whether they should act upon these beliefs (normative ethics), and why 
these beliefs turn out to be true or false (moral metaphysics) constitute three of the core problems 
of ethics and metaethics. Identifying these fault lines in the bedrock of philosophical conviction, 
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and studying the theoretical rifts and argumentative forces that arise from these conceptual 
divisions, are at the heart of analytic philosophy.     
 
4.7.5. Why do philosophers care about free will? 
 
Most philosophers seem to care about free will because of “the internal conception of agency and 
its special connection with the moral attitudes as opposed to other types of value” (Nagel, 1979). 
But postulating entities solely on the basis of their conformity to our internal conception of 
phenomena in the external world is not especially instructive or practical. Furthermore, 
philosophy stands to gain little by characterizing ordinary philosophical judgments as 
paradoxical, errant, unnatural, unreliable, or irrelevant. I therefore think that we should shift our 
efforts away from such causes, and focus instead on answering two more basic questions. 
First, we might ask what guides our conceptual behavior in the moral-agentive domain. 
The past decade of research in moral psychology and experimental philosophy has already begun 
answering this question, and has yielded a wealth of knowledge to which I am indebted for many 
of the ideas I have discussed here. Second, we might ask what the psychological structure of 
moral-agentive constructs can reveal to us about debates in philosophy. The agency-last 
paradigm equips us for both lines of inquiry, providing a propitious opportunity for 
philosophical prospecting. On this approach, ostensibly competing ordinary attributions of free 
will might be brought into harmony. Might competing philosophical theories, which have 
heretofore been considered by many to be equally motley, be seen to have much more in 
common with one another when viewed through the lens of the agency-last paradigm? In the 
next (and final) section of this chapter, I offer an affirmative answer to this question.  
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There are several directions in which one might take this line of inquiry. A historian of 
philosophy might ask, as Nietzsche did, where “the thought that ‘the criminal deserves 
punishment, because he could have acted otherwise’” first arose within “the psychology of 
mankind in its early stages” (1887/1967). A cognitive psychologist might seek to study the 
component processes that lead to the ascription of certain moral-agentive attributes under various 
conditions. I think both of these approaches may be rife for innovative and fruitful projects. But 
in the space that remains, I only want to explain how the discovery of the psychological tendency 
to infer free will from moral responsibility may help us enrich our understanding of some of the 
most important insights in 20th century analytic philosophy. And so after disowning the idea that 
it is worth pursuing any error theory at all, and rejecting both the normative and deflationist 
stances, I expand in the final section on the deeper philosophical implications of the agency-last 
paradigm.  
 
4.8. Agency-Last Perspectives on Classic Metaethical Puzzles 
 
It may seem as though I have impugned some of the most fundamental beliefs of philosophers 
and non-philosophers alike, but this is not the case at all. I do not think that my beliefs are 
fundamentally all that different from those of most other philosophers. I am of the deepest 
conviction that in a literal sense, many of the most prominent figures in 20th and 21st century 
philosophy have tacitly operated within the agency-last paradigm. The views of many others can 
also be much better understood if we adopt this perspective. Just as the logically deduced 
taxonomies worked out by philosophers like Fischer (1987) have had major implications for the 
empirical study of moral cognition, discoveries in moral psychology—including those presented 
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here—might help us better understand the philosophy of moral agency. The agency-last 
paradigm provides a theoretical and methodological instrument that not only helps us understand 
ordinary moral-agentive cognition and attribution, but which also yields a plausible philosophical 
framework that reduces free will to little more than a morally motivated accusation. 
 
4.8.1. Contempt, Coercion, and Control 
 
The agency-last paradigm can help us better understand Strawson’s claims in Freedom and 
Resentment, where he suggests that free will is only an account of others’ “attitudes towards us 
of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on 
the other” (1963). But attitudes like goodwill and contempt are inherently moralistic, and as 
Strawson himself points out, we can only hold these attitudes toward those we view as persons 
responsible for their own behavior. We could not, for instance, be contemptuous of a chalkboard 
for being the teacher’s pet. All of this suggests that asking whether an agent who is thought to be 
morally responsible does or does not have free will might only serve to beg the question, and that 
Strawson does not push his view far enough. Whereas Strawson suggests that free will may be 
fundamentally ineluctable, I see no reason why this should be the case. I think that questions 
about moral responsibility are primary to, and cannot be furthered by, inquiries into free will. 
The attitudes for which Strawson takes free will to be a kind of shorthand may or may not be 
held by those to whom we attribute them. But the automaticity with which we deride wrongdoers 
for their calculated willfulness seems to unveil ‘free will’ as nothing more than a moral epithet. 
Like Strawson, Frankfurt recognizes the immediacy of moral responsibility from action. 
In Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, he describes a man who, in accord with his 
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own motivations, performs a certain action that another man would have forced him to perform, 
had he himself lacked the initiative to do so autonomously. In unpacking this case, Frankfurt 
points out that in at least some instances, the moral responsibility of an agent is decidable even if 
it remains unknown whether that agent could have freely chosen from among alternative possible 
courses of action:  
 
The fact that a person was coerced to act as he did may entail both that he could 
not have done otherwise and that he bears no moral responsibility for his action. 
But his lack of moral responsibility is not entailed by his having been unable to do 
otherwise (1969). 
 
But in trying to leverage free will into the space that Frankfurt’s moral argument opens up, his 
interpreters20 end up sapping free will of its primary value—subservience to the notion of moral 
responsibility.  
                                                            
20 I do not think it would be fair to attribute this interpretation to Frankfurt himself. My reading, 
though it seems to be an unpopular one, is that Frankfurt makes a conspicuous effort to establish 
moral responsibility without reference to the spooky notion of free will:  
 
The two main concepts employed in the principle of alternate possibilities are "morally 
responsible" and "could have done otherwise." To discuss the principle without analyzing 
either of these may well seem like an attempt at piracy. The reader should rake notice that 
my Jolly Roger is now unfurled (1969). 
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The problems identified by Nagel in Moral Luck also largely resolve themselves if we 
reject the agency-first assumption, and instead take an agency-last approach. Nagel points out 
the (fairly obvious) fact that moral responsibility for what one has done depends on what one has 
actually done, and therefore also the circumstances in which one has done it and the outcomes to 
which it led. He recognizes that “from the point of view which makes responsibility dependent 
on control, all this seems absurd” (1979), but he also recognizes that the dependence of moral 
judgment on circumstance and outcome is clearly not absurd. In fact, its independence would be 
absurd, potentially leading to consequences like the jailing of all people who, while dialing their 
cell phones at the wheel of their cars, had the good fortune not to inadvertently strike and kill 
children. Nagel is deeply perplexed by the apparent tension between the principle that we are not 
responsible for outcomes outside of our control, and the realization that in real-life cases people 
are never or almost never in control of the outcomes of their behavior, This tension perplexes 
him so much that he describes it as paradoxical. But for whatever reason, he fails to recognize 
that the rejection of this paradoxical ‘Principle of Control’ is not the only was to dissolve the 
absurdity he discusses. Instead, one might simply reject the agency-first paradigm, which is at 
the root of his “point of view which makes responsibility dependent on control.”  
 
4.8.2. The Puzzle of Moral-Agentive Cognition 
 
Perhaps the most ironic place in which a potential agency-last solution to—or rather, dissolution 
of—the “abstract/concrete paradox” in moral psychology is approached but never quite captured 
is the very work that first brought that puzzle into the spotlight. In a footnote in that article, 
Nichols and Knobe acknowledge that “one might maintain that determinism is compatible with 
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moral responsibility but not with free will” (2007). This rather deft observation—which they 
credit to Fischer (1987), but whose philosophical roots, it can now be seen, run much deeper than 
that—is tantamount to an admission that factors that impinge upon free will do not necessarily 
impinge upon moral responsibility.  
At the same time, Nichols seems to recognize that there is widespread acceptance that 
facts about MR necessarily entail ones about FW. When Science published his repackaging of 
this same dataset from Nichols and Knobe (2007) as “The Experimental Philosophy of Free 
Will,” nobody blinked an eye at the fact that the data only reflected judgments of whether agents 
were “fully morally responsible” (2011). But it should be clear to the reader by now that using 
‘free will’ as a stand-in for ‘moral responsibility’ in this way is deeply problematic. The 
presumable justification for taking such liberties is that one need not hold any particular position 
about free will in order to hold a given position toward moral responsibility, but that views on 
moral responsibility necessarily inform free will attitudes. But this, of course, is an agency-last 
justification. Thus, it still fails to answer the question of how research into free will matters, even 
if a deeper understanding of moral responsibility does. This, in turn, raises the question of what 
to make of the concept of free will itself. I conclude with my views on this subject. 
 
4.8.3. Free Will as Moral Ether 
 
Freedom of choice, unlike violations of moral principles, is not something that others commit and 
that we observe. Freedom of choice is only something that other people are said to possess. In 
this way, the concept of free will is by its very design opaque. Whereas the observation of 
transgressions and the assignment of responsibility for those transgressions are both significant 
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because of the causal roles they plays in individual and social behavior and regulation, free will 
occupies, at best, a latecomer’s role in social explanation. But the agency-last structure of moral-
agentive cognition calls even this minimal value into question.  
The notion of free will may have been central to a framework that people once had to 
assume in order to most successfully theorize about the connection between moral-agentive 
relata. In this sense, there may have been a time when appeal to free will could be justified as a 
(meta-theoretically desirable) form of inference to the best explanation. Over time, the centrality 
of that notion has been codified to the point of dogma, but the pre-scientific concept of free will 
has become so disconnected from the rest of our contemporary explanatory framework as to be 
merely nominal.  
From an ontological perspective, the proposed existence of free will is not so much false, 
as it is an empty hypothesis. Moral responsibility without free will is only inconceivable in the 
trivial sense in which “space without ether is unthinkable” (Einstein, 2010/1920).” In this sense, 
free will is only a kind of moral ether. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ADJUDICATING ADJUDICATION 
 
In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. "But it must be like this!" is not a 
philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone admits. 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Philosophical Investigations” 
 
Does evidence of a biomechanical cause of psychopathy reduce sentencing to the same extent for 
male and female judges? An experiment published last year found that when psychiatric 
evidence of criminal psychopathy was supplemented by evidence of an underlying 
biomechanism, judges assigned shorter average sentences and were more likely to cite at least 
one mitigating factor of psychopathy in accompanying written opinions. But it remains unclear 
whether the absence of neurobiological evidence justifies the retention of longer sentences, and 
unclear whether the opinions of this judicial sample are widely held, or reflect the unique 
demographics of the U.S. state trial judiciary. Here, a reanalysis of the data in which this effect 
was first revealed found no effect of biomechanism on female judges’ sentencing or written 
opinions. These results suggest that it is worth further investigating whether the 
overrepresentation of men on the bench may lead to a hard-scientific bias in U.S. state courts. 
Additionally, the findings highlight the need to develop a scientific understanding of the social 
forces that give rise to these gender differences in the first place. 
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5.1. The Double-Edged Sword 
 
As scientific understanding of the relationship between neurobiology and behavior becomes 
increasingly sophisticated, policymakers are faced with the challenge of assuring that this new 
knowledge is applied in ethical ways. There seems to be implicit agreement among scientists and 
philosophers that it is our responsibility to adhere to a principle of epistemic caution, according 
to which our neuroethical policies should never outpace our neuroscientific knowledge. But this 
principle may have the paradoxical effect of preventing some life-or-death decisions from being 
made on the basis of uncertain scientific premises, only to allow those choices to be decided by 
systemic social inequalities. Here, I discuss a neurogenetic allele whose influence on behavior is 
unclear to scientists, whose potential philosophical implications remain disputed by ethicists, yet 
whose exclusion from the courtroom has clear and troubling inegalitarian implications. 
In a recent experiment, Aspinwall, Brown, and Tabery (2012a) found that U.S. state trial 
judges assigned shorter average sentences to criminal psychopaths when psychiatric diagnoses 
were accompanied by supplementary evidence of an underlying neurobiological cause, rather 
than being presented without biomechanical explanation. Differences in sentencing seemed 
deliberative, as supplementary neuroscience testimony led to more frequent mention of 
mitigating aspects of psychopathy in judges’ written explanations of their reasoning, and to 
decreased Likert ratings of the extent to which the evidence of psychopathy aggravated 
punishment. These findings highlight several issues in determining the appropriateness and 
admissibility of neuroscience testimony in the courtroom. 
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5.2. Scientific & Philosophical Skepticism  
 
It remains unclear to neuroscientists how or even whether biomechanisms like the one described 
to the judges in this experiment relate to recidivism (Tikkanen et al., 2011) and reform (Lester & 
Eley, 2013). The psychiatric diagnosis provided to judges in both experimental conditions (Hare 
et al., 1990) is actually a much better predictor of future violence than the neurogenetic 
polymorphism whose presence or absence made such a difference in sentencing. In fact, the 
same allele thought to put those who have not experienced childhood maltreatment at increased 
risk for violent behavior appears to place those who were not mistreated as children at decreased 
risk for that same kind of behavior (Tabery, 2009).  
There are also philosophical reasons to doubt that there is anything especially exculpating 
about the loss of control to biomechanical factors, as opposed to more ordinary factors like 
poverty, childhood maltreatment, and dumb luck (Nagel, 1979). Many bioethicists reject the idea 
that there is any “bright line” distinguishing the appropriate consideration of genetic and non-
genetic influences on behavior (Silvers and Stein, 2003). All of these considerations suggest that 
the sentences judges assign to criminal psychopaths may be biased by the presence of 
neuroscience evidence whose forensic and moral value is uncertain. Nonetheless, there are 
reasons to think that the absence of this same type of evidence might bias the judicial system 
toward the opinions of male judges.  
Previous research has found that women tend to be more skeptical of biotechnologies 
than men tend to be, especially when policies rely on the opinions of experts, rather than those of 
the public (Simon, 2010). One study found that scientific knowledge led women to be more 
skeptical toward scientific experts, whereas it led men to be more credulous toward experts 
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(Hayes & Tariq, 2000). These gender differences in attitude toward science, together with the 
seductive allure of neuroscience explanations (Weisberg et al., 2008), raise an important 
question: might the hard-scientific bias seen among U.S. state trial judges be an artifact of the 
gender imbalance in the American judiciary? 
 
5.3. Experiment 
 
Here, I present a reanalysis of the data from Aspinwall et al. (2012a, 2012b), which was 
conducted in order to test the hypothesis that gender moderated the effect of biomechanism on 
judges’ sentencing of criminal psychopaths. The results suggest a clear-cut matter of injustice: 
only male judges, who account for 73% of U.S. state trial judges (Kimball et al., 2013), assigned 
significantly longer sentences (M = 3.556 years, SEM = 1.498) and were significantly less likely 
to cite evidence of psychopathy as a mitigating factor (OR = 0.3671, 95% CI [0.1793, 0.7517]) 
when biomechanical evidence was absent (Figure 12). 
 
  
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 101 
Figure 12. Influence of Additional Biomechanism on Sentencing by Male and Female Judges 
 
Figure 12. N indicates the total number of judges of each gender in each experimental condition, 
collapsed across presenting party (1,3). (A) Average sentencing with and without evidence of 
low MAOA activity, by gender of judge. Based on estimated marginal means from ANOVA, 
collapsed across presenting party (1,3). Error bars represent ±1 SEM. (B) Percentage of judges 
who mentioned at least one mitigating factor concerning the evidence of psychopathy in their 
written explanations of the reasoning behind the sentences they rendered. 
  
5.4. Discussion 
 
These data suggest a male judicial bias in favor of unverified ‘hard science’ (Haberstick et al., 
2014) over better-verified ‘soft science’ (Grann et al., 1999). Lacunae in knowledge always 
necessitate a reliance on opinion, and there is nothing inherently unethical or unscientific about 
making value judgments in interpreting contested scientific claims. But allowing the gender 
composition of the judiciary to decide between competing systems of scientific values—the 
value systems according to which ambiguous neurobiological testimony is interpreted—is both 
unscientific and unfair.  
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The limited experimental sample of female judges leaves open the possibility of a small but 
undetected effect of biomechanism on the sentences they assigned. Still, the results imply that the 
appropriate treatment of neuroscience evidence in the courtroom does not just depend on the 
consequences of its admission, but also on the consequences of its inadvertent omission and its 
deliberate exclusion. This means that we cannot wait until neuroscience advances before we 
address potential biases in neuroethical policy. Decisions about the admissibility of this kind of 
neuroscience testimony are already being made (Forzano et al., 2010), and to the extent that these 
decisions might increase reliance on inegalitarian values, their biasing effects must be adjudicated 
now. But how? 
The first step in addressing the potential over-representation of a hard-scientific bias 
among male judges is to raise awareness of the issue. In deciding how to act on this knowledge, 
it may be essential to recognize that despite its scientific merits, the principle of epistemic 
caution might itself need to be applied with caution in cases that are entangled with issues of 
social justice, such as gender inequality on the bench. Moving forward, it may also prove 
invaluable to study the psychological and sociological factors that underwrite these gender 
differences in judicial opinion, and gender differences in public attitudes toward science more 
generally. Doing so might help us not only to identify and remedy their effects on judicial 
sentencing, but also to understand and address the social forces that give rise to these gender 
differences in the first place.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES & PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS 
 
Returning to the focal question of this project, we can once again ask: why do people disagree 
about the answers to philosophical questions? Many answers have been proposed, and my 
suggestion has been that many answers are, in fact, correct in different cases. It all depends on 
what kind of philosophical question is being asked. Furthermore, if the causes of philosophical 
dispute are diverse, then the traditional analytic method will only work for some disputes, and 
we will need other methods to work with disputes whose underlying causes are different from 
those usually anticipated by analytic philosophers. This is why it may be so valuable to have the 
taxonomy that lets us understand the type of issues at stake. Once we know what kind of 
disagreement something is, we can better draw on our understanding of that type of disagreement 
to better develop and test hypotheses about how to resolve it.  
 
6.1. Recommendations 
 
In order to adjudicate philosophical disputes, interlocutors need to ask each other the right 
questions, in order to establish which issues are at stake, and which are being set aside (at least 
for the purposes of a given dispute). To bring disputants together in agreement over a single 
conclusion, we first need to identify where party lines are being drawn. If intuitions were always 
truth-evaluable—that is, if every intuition were about facts that were either true or false—then 
philosophers would be justified in using contradiction and negation to infer from true intuitive 
premises that all conflicting intuitions are false. But I have argued the intentional object (Searle, 
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1980) of an intuition very often lacks facticity, because intuitions depend of factors that naturally 
vary between individuals.  
A dispute that is ostensibly about some object or phenomenon in the external world 
cannot be adjudicated if that dispute arises, at least in part, because the object or phenomenon at 
issue for one disputant is not the same as that for another disputant. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
because a robot’s ability to undergo the phenomenology of love leaves ambiguous what is meant 
by love itself, the phenomenology being debated will differ from person to person. It follows 
from this that the truth of a given evidential foundation—and in particular, the propriety of some 
intuition—does not necessarily imply that intuitive evidence in conflict with it is false or 
improper in some way.  
The fact that one disputant is right to assert something does not mean that her interlocutor 
would necessarily be wrong to deny it. Therefore, philosophical insights are not necessarily ones 
that tell us one theorist is right and her detractor is wrong. Instead, we will often gain insight by 
understanding how the theorist and her detractor could have both come to hold reasonable, 
accurate views, even though those views appear to stand in contrast to one another. The study of 
individual differences is crucial to a strong understanding of why people disagree about the 
answers to philosophical questions, and this understanding is essential to understanding what the 
very topic or topics at stake in a philosophical dispute are. 
The traditional approach to resolving philosophical disputes also has a decidedly 
normative dimension. Only one intuition can be right, and all others are wrong; only one tree of 
deductive inferences from that intuition is good, and everything else is bad. This disease of 
equating description (of arguments) with normative claims about those arguments is, and has for 
a long time been, one of the main diseases of philosophy. My proposal has been to respond to 
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these considerations by deemphasizing the question of what people should believe. Instead, it is 
more informative and less presumptuous to focus on why and in what sense they believe it.  
The taxonomy I have proposed helps focus questions in these domains. People may hold 
conflicting views because at least one of them is reasoning incorrectly, or because there are 
multiple rationally acceptable modes of inference about a question—because the dispute is 
faultless. And people may hold conflicting views because the sense in which they mean whatever 
it is they claim to believe differs—that is, because the putative concepts being referred to by 
disputants, and the facts in dispute, are actually slightly different from one another. 
 
6.2. Shortcomings & Future Directions 
 
The presentation herein has been taxonomic in nature, and while I have argued that the 
development and defense of a taxonomy of philosophical dispute is the central value of the work 
as it is presented here, the use of these data in that mode also has major downsides. While I have 
striven for cohesion of the case study chapter structure to the taxonomy outlined in Chapter One, 
perhaps my biggest disappointment in the foregoing chapters is their lack of cohesion to one 
another. However, this disappointment needs to be qualified in two ways.  
First, I wish to make clear the project you see in front of you is incomplete. Filling in the 
remaining interstitial spaces with the missing pieces of theory and evidence is a project that I 
have set out for myself as a long-term research program, and will require more empirical and 
literature-based research. Second, I wish to make clear that the lack of cohesion is in large part a 
shortcoming of the chapters and their portrayals of the research projects, not a problem of the 
research projects themselves. The theoretic motivations for each study were drawn from the 
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studies that came before it. But so far, the data I have collected is only consistent with—not 
evidence for—the hypothesis that the underlying cause of gender differences in all three studies 
is related. 
These chapters represent the progression of a single project over several years. Chapters 
Two and Three fit rather neatly into the traditional philosophical categories of subjectivism or 
relativism (in the case of Chapter Two), and realism or objectivism (in the case of Chapter 
Three). The purpose of this project has been to get away from this facile dichotomy. 
Additionally, each chapter was, at some point, a “future direction” suggested by the last. For 
these reasons, I focus this discussion of future directions on Chapters Three and Four, both of 
which I am in the process of expanding. Their expansion represents two distinct lines of 
research—one in moral psychology, and one in neuroethics—but as Chapter Four was initially a 
“future direction” suggested by Chapter Three, these lines of research continue to influence one 
another. 
 
6.2.1. Expanding the Agency-Last Paradigm 
 
After noticing that people tend to employ different responsibility constructs when asked to place 
blame in different situations, we might ask what guides this behavior. Elsewhere, I argue that 
people do not tend to toggle between different constructs of moral responsibility on the basis of 
the situations that they encounter. Instead, I suggest that those who endorse a definition of 
responsibility-as-accountability tend to place blame in proportion to the severity of moral 
transgressions and actual involvement in those transgressions, whereas those who endorse a view 
of responsibility-as-capacity (most commonly, the capacity to do otherwise) are largely 
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indifferent to this sort of information. Second, we might ask what this new, non-error-theoretic 
taxonomy might reveal about the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists, especially 
when examined through the lens of the agency-last paradigm. However, this question could not 
be studied in sufficient depth without running experiments outside the scope of the philosophical 
work you seen in front of you. 
Evidence collected for Chapter Four supports the alternative hypothesis that instead, 
responding differently to our different cases can be accounted for by the notion of moral 
responsibility people endorse in the abstract. These data were collected, like the rest of the data 
presented here, with survey methods. This method has a number of limitations, many of which 
have been discussed here. But most relevant to the expansion of the agency-last paradigm, paper-
and-pencil surveys that ask directly about moral responsibility in a concrete case cannot also be 
used to collect data about how much, abstractly speaking, an individual thinks that the nature of a 
crime bears on moral responsibility for that crime. 
 
6.2.2. Better Adjudicating Adjudication  
 
At the end of Chapter Five, I stop short of making strong, concrete recommendations for 
addressing the gender discrepancy in the sentencing of criminal psychopaths. I do this on 
principle, because of a lack of clarity in the data discussed in that chapter. It remains unclear 
whether the gender differences described in that chapter are due to a bias among male judges for 
of unverified ‘hard science’ (a form of scientism), a bias among female judges against unverified 
‘hard science’ (a form of skepticism), or some combination thereof.  
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Furthermore, there is an even more basic characterization nature of the differences 
underwriting this bias cannot be inferred from this experiment. It cannot even be said with 
certainty whether these gender differences in belief are moral or scientific in nature. Presently, I 
am working a project aimed at untangle the many logical and argumentative kinks in the data 
discussed in that chapter. Although I hope that I (and others) may engage in further empirical 
research into the causes of these gender differences and potential ways to adjudicate 
experimental data with only yield theoretic clarity after this untangling is complete. There are a 
number of confounded issues in the data that need redress, but I think that the keystone issue is 
identifying which of the following theses manifests the gender differences underwriting the 
discrepance in sentencing mitigation:  
 
(1) Biomechanism warrants a reduction in sentencing. 
(2) Psychopathy warrants a reduction in sentencing. 
(3) Biomechanism is evidence of psychopathy. 
 
Thesis (1) is a view about the presence of external influences on an agent’s behavior, and 
their bearing on sentencing. In contrast, (2) regards the absence of internal influences that might 
bear on sentencing. Proposition (3) differs fundamentally from both (1) and (2), as it regards 
evidence for scientific diagnosis, rather than grounds for judicial prescription. The distinction 
between (1) and (2) can be further illustrated by attending to differences in the actual testimony 
read by judges in each experimental condition. In the neurobiologist’s testimony, blame is 
offloaded onto genes through a clear-cut domino effect, whereby genes cause a broken 
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mechanism, a broken mechanism causes an inability to learn, and an inability to learn prevents 
healthy socialization: 
 
Psychopaths, because of their genetically-induced dysfunctional violence-inhibition 
mechanism, do not learn to associate distress in others with anxiety in themselves and are 
thus resistant to moral socialization. 
 
Notably, the psychiatrist’s testimony does not provide a less scientific-sounding 
explanation of why the criminal did not socialize like the rest of his peers. It provides no 
explanation at all, instead only begging the question why the criminal is so poorly-socialized in 
the first place: “psychopaths are resistant to moral socialization because of their disorder,” i.e. 
psychopathy. Thus, it remains unclear whether male and female judges differed in their treatment 
of neurobiological versus psychiatric testimony, or in their requirements for causal explanations 
of moral patiency. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
 
Neither of these future directions represents the first time I have suggested that, first and 
foremost, we need to address issues of conceptual disentanglement. The prime importance of that 
goal was hypothesized at the beginning of the opening chapter, in which I suggested that only by 
identifying the contours of philosophical disputes, and the factors that draw people across those 
fault lines, can we even begin to really understand the concepts and theories in dispute.  
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Notably, because turns out to be a plurality of causes for the diversity of philosophical 
belief—and here, I have identified just a few among many—then no single method of inquiry or 
dialogue is sufficient for scrutinizing the entirety of the philosophical landscape. Instead, a 
variety of approaches is called for. But in order to know what approach to take to a given 
philosophical question—that is, what kind of answer is even to be sought—we need to employ 
the taxonomy of causes of philosophical dispute that I have outlined and illustrated in the 
preceding chapters. Such a taxonomy has helped us better identify the causes of the 
philosophical disputes discussed in this work, and can help us to do so in many more cases, as 
well as help us discover potential modes of resolution to such disputes. It is for this reason that I 
have used this forum to develop, defend, and demonstrate a taxonomy of philosophical dispute 
that covers not only the rational-irrational and true-false dimensions of dispute, but the faulty-
faultless and factive-factless dimensions as well. 
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Appendix 
1. Suppose scientists figure out the exact state of the universe during the big bang, and 
figure out all the laws of physics as well. They put this information into a computer, and the 
computer perfectly predicts everything that has ever happened. In other words, they prove that 
everything that happens, has to happen exactly that way because of the laws of physics and 
everything that's come before. In this case, is a person free to choose whether or not to murder 
someone? 
2. Suppose you drive to the local baseball stadium with some friends, and try to buy tickets 
at the door. There are 7 of you, but there are only 6 tickets left. You can either drive everyone to 
a nearby bar, which will be a lot less fun than being at the game, or 6 of you can go in, and 1 of 
you can take the bus home and miss the game entirely. Is it most fair for everyone to go to the 
bar? 
3. Suppose a mad scientist takes out your brain, and puts it in your best friend’s head. 
During the same operation, the scientist takes out your friend’s brain, and puts it in your head. 
Now your body has your friend’s brain, and your friend’s body has your brain. Your heroic 
mother storms into the room to save you, but not your friend, who she believes got you into this 
mess. Is the person with your body still you, her son? 
4. Suppose neuroscientists are able to identify every part and every connection in the human 
brain. Working with a team of computer scientists, they then build a robot that has a complete 
electronic replica of the human brain. Could this robot experience love? 
5. Suppose that all you know about Einstein is that he developed the Theory of Relativity. 
But suppose it turns out that Einstein actually stole the idea from some guy named Moynahan, 
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who nobody has ever heard of. In this case, when you use the name “Einstein,” are you actually 
referring to Moynahan? 
6. Suppose you hear the sound of your cell phone, so you reach in your pocket and answer 
the call. Your landlord is on the line, but you realize later that your ringer was off, and the sound 
you heard was actually someone else’s phone. When you heard that other person’s phone ring 
and mistook it as your own, did you actually know someone was calling you? 
7. Suppose you meet a man from the future who knows everything there is to know about 
science. He tells you that he doesn’t like apples, and says that though he has never eaten one, he 
has figured out what apples taste like just by studying the relevant science. Could he know what 
apples taste like without ever having eaten one? 
8. Suppose scientists are able to use stem cells to grow lungs that breathe without being 
connected to a body. They then grow a heart that pumps without being connected to a body. If 
they can do all this, can they create a brain that thinks without being connected to a body? 
9. Suppose a runaway train is coming down a track, and is certain to kill five workmen who 
can't get out of the way. You're standing next to the controls and can switch the train to the other 
track, but if you flip the switch, one man working on that track is sure to die. Should you flip the 
switch? 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 113 
References 
Adleberg, T., Thompson, M., & Nahmias, E. (2013). Do women and men have different 
philosophical intuitions? A failure to replicate results from Buckwalter & Stich. 
Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., & Bloom, D. (2011). Causation, norm violation, and culpable control. 
Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670. 
Allport, G.W., & Odbert, H.S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological 
Monographs, 47(211). 
Antony, L. (2012). Different voices or perfect storm: Why are there so few women in 
philosophy? Journal of Social Philosophy, 43(3), 227–255.  
Arbesman, S., & Strogatz, S. H. (2008). A Monte Carlo Approach to Joe DiMaggio and Streaks  
            in Baseball 1, 1–14. 
Arvan, M. (2011). Bad news for conservatives? Moral judgments and the dark triad  
            personality traits: A correlational study. Neuroethics.  
Aspinwall, L. G., Brown, T. R. and Tabery, J. (2012a). The double-edged sword: does 
biomechanism increase or decrease judges’ sentencing of psychopaths? Science 337, 
846–849. 
Aspinwall, L. G., Brown, T. R. and Tabery, J. (2012b). Supplementary materials for The 
double-edged sword: does biomechanism increase or decrease judges’ sentencing of 
psychopaths? [Supplemental material]. Science 337: Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencemag.org/ 
Ayer, A. J. (1952). Logic, Truth, and Language. New York: Dover Press. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 114 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1182. 
Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Free will in scientific psychology. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 3(1), 14–19.  
Beebee, H. (2013) Women and deviance in philosophy.” In K. Hutchison 7 F. Jenkins, (Eds.) 
Women in philosophy: What needs to change. 
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. Sage Focus 
Editions, 154, 136-136. 
Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S. (2013). Gender and philosophical intuition. Available at SSRN 
1683066, 2, 1–43. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1683066. 
Cappelen, H. (2012). Philosophy without intuitions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Sussex: Psychology 
Press. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciencies. Routledge. 
Cokely, E.T., & Feltz, A. (2009a). Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 355-357. 
Cokely, E.T., & Feltz, A. (2009b). Individual differences, judgment biases, and theory-of-mind: 
Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 43, 18-24. 
Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow room: The varieties of free will worth wanting. The MIT Press. 
Devitt, M. (2011). Experimental semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(2), 
418-435. 
Digman, J.M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model. Annual Review 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 115 
of Psychology 41, 417-440. 
Einstein, A. (1954). The problem of space, ether, and the field in physics. In C. Seelig (Ed.) & 
S. Bargmann (Trans.), Ideas and opinions. New York, NY: Wings Books. (Original 
work published 1934). 
Einstein, A. (2010). Ether and relativity. In G. G. Jeffrey & W. Perrett (Trans.), Sidelights on 
relativity. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. (Original work published 1920).  
Feltz, A. (2013). Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental 
philosophy of free will. Consciousness and cognition, 22(1), 53-63. 
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E. T. (2008). The fragmented folk: More evidence of stable individual 
differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions. In B.C. Love, K. McRae &  
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2009). Do judgments about freedom and responsibility 
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E.T. (2011). The philosophical personality argument. Philosophical 
Studies. 
Fischer, J. M. Responsibility and control. Journal of Philosophy, 79(1), 24–40. 
Fischer, J. M. Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility (1987). In F. Schoeman (Ed.), 
Responsibility, character, and the emotions pp. (81-106). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Forzano, F., Borry, P., Cambon-Thomsen, A., Hodgson, S. V., Tibben A., de Vries, P., et al. 
(2010). Italian appeal court: a genetic predisposition to commit murder? European 
Journal of Human Genetics 18, 519–521. 
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of 
Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839. 
Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic,  
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 116 
for pure thought. From Frege to Gödel: A source book in mathematical logic, 1931, 1-
82. 
Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23, 121–23. 
Gibbard, A., & Blackburn, S. (1992). Morality and thick concepts. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 267–299. 
Goldberg, L.R. (1992). The development markers of the Big-Five factor structure. 
Psychological assessment, 4(1), 26-42. 
Gould, S. J. The streak of streaks. The New York Review of Books, August 18, 1988. 
Grann, D. (2009, September 7). Trial by fire: Did Texas execute an innocent man? The New 
Yorker. 
Grann, M., Långström, N., Tengström, A., and Kullgren, G. (1999). Psychopathy (PCL-R) 
predicts violent recidivism among criminal offenders with personality disorders in 
Sweden. Law and Human Behavior 23, 205–217. 
Haberstick, B. C., Lessem, J. M., Hewitt, J. K., Smolen, A., Hopfer, C. J., Halpern C. T., et al. 
(2014). MAOA genotype, childhood maltreatment, and their interaction in the etiology 
of adult antisocial behaviors. Biological Psychiatry 75, 25–30. 
Hare, R. D., Harpur, T. J., Hakstian, A. R., Forth, A. E., Hart, S. D., and Newman, J. P. (1990). 
The revised Psychopathy Checklist: reliability and factor structure. Psychological 
Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 2, 338-441. 
Hare, R. M. (1952). The language of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new 
millennium. Communication Monographs, 76(4), 408-420. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis. 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 117 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Hayes, B. C., and Tariq, V. N. (2000). Gender differences in scientific knowledge and attitudes 
toward science: a comparative study of four Anglo-American Nations. Public 
Understanding of Science 9, 433-447.  
Holtzman, G. S. (2013). Do personality effects mean philosophy is intrinsically subjective? 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(5-6), 27-42. 
Holtzman, G. S. (under review A). The agency-last paradigm: Free will as moral ether. 
Holtzman, G. S. (under review B). Adjudicating Adjudication: Gender Moderates the Effect of 
Biomechanism on Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths 
Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A 
Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1-55. 
Hume, D. (1740/2003). A treatise of human nature. New York: Courier Dover Publications. 
J., Ojansuu, I., and Virkkunen, M. (2011). Psychopathy, PCL-R, and MAOA genotype as 
predictors of violent reconvictions. Psychiatry Research 185, 382–386. 
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn't know. Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291-295. 
Jackson, F., Oppy, G., & Smith, M. (1994). Minimalism and truth aptness. Mind, 287–302. 
James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind, 34, 188–205. 
John, O., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big-Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and 
theoretical perspectives. In L. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: 
Theory and research (2nd ed.) (pp. 66–100). New York: Guilford.  
John, O., Gosling, S., & Potter, J. (2003). Development of personality in early and middle 
adulthood: set like plaster or persistent change? Journal of Personality and Social 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 118 
Psychology, 84(5), 1041-1053.  
Kane, R. (1999). Responsibility, luck, and chance: reflections on free will and indeterminism. 
The Journal of Philosophy, 217-240. 
Kant, I. (1785/1998). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (M. J. Gregor, Trans.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kauppinen, A. (2007) The rise and fall of experimental philosophy. Philosophical Explorations, 
10(2), 95–118. 
Kimball, J., Brown, R., Davila, J., Madrid, S., and Pandya, R., Eds. (2013). The American 
Bench: Judges of the Nation, ed. 12. Dallas: Foster-Long. 
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Knobe, J. (2004). Intention, intentional action and moral considerations. Analysis, 64(282), 181-
187. 
Knobe, J., & Nichols, S. (2013). Experimental philosophy (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press. 
Kolodny, N. (2005). Why be rational? Mind, 114 pp. 509–63.  
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientiﬁc revolutions. Chicago and London. 
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Leslie, A. M., Knobe, J., & Cohen, A. (2006). Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 
Theory of mind and moral judgment. Psychological Science, 17(5), 421–427.  
Lester, K. J., and Eley, T. C. (2013). Therapygenetics: using genetic markers to predict response 
to psychological treatment for mood and anxiety disorders. Biology of Mood & Anxiety 
Disorders 3, 1-16. 
Machery, E., & Systma, J. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 119 
Studies, 151(2), 299-327. 
Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2004).  Semantics, cross-cultural style.  
Cognition, 92, B1-B12.  
MacKinnon, D. P., & Dwyer, J. H. (1993). Estimating mediated effects in prevention studies. 
Evaluation Review, 17(2), 144-158. 
Mandelbaum, E., & Ripley, D. (2012). Explaining the abstract/concrete paradoxes in moral 
psychology: The NBAR hypothesis. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(3), 351–
368. 
Maxwell, J. C. (1878). Ether. In W. R. Smith (Ed.), Encyclopedia Brittanica (9th ed.). 
Mccotter, T. (2008). Hitting Streaks Don’t Obey Your Rules. Chance, 31(4), 62–70. 
McCrae, R.R., & John, O.P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its 
applications. Journal of Personality: 60, 175–215. 
Mill, J. S. (1848/2011). A system of logic: Ratiocinative and inductive (7th ed., Vol. 2). London: 
Longmans, Green and Company. 
Minkov, M. (2012). World values survey. The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of globalization. 
Nadelhoffer, T., Kvaran, T., & Nahmias, E. (2009). Temperament and intuition: A commentary 
on Feltz and Cokley. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 351–355.  
Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Nahmias, E. (2006). Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. 
reductionism. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1-2), 215–237. 
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005). Surveying freedom  : Folk 
intuitions about moral responsibility and free will, 18(5), 561–584.  
Nichols, S. (2011). Experimental philosophy and the problem of free will. Science, 331(6023), 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 120 
1401-1403. 
Nichols, S. & Ulatowski, J. (2007). Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect 
revisited. Mind & Language, 22, 346–365. 
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of 
folk intuition. Nous, 41, 663-685. 
Nietzsche, F. W. (1887/1967). On the genealogy of morals. (W. Kauffman, Trans.). New York, 
NY: Random House. 
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Paradigm (June, 2005). In Oxford English Dictionary Online (3rd ed.; 2014). Retrieved from 
http://www.oed.com/. 
Paulhus, D. L., & Carey, J. M. (2011). The FAD-Plus: measuring lay beliefs regarding free will 
and related constructs. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93(1), 96–104. 
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Poincaré, H. (1905). Science and hypothesis, W. J. G. (Trans.). Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Prinz, J. J. (2007). The emotional construction of morals. Oxford University Press. 
Prinz, J. J. (in preparation). Metaethical naturalism. 
Prinz, J. J. (in preparation). Moral bondage. 
Rockoff, D. M., Yates, P. A., Rockoff, D. M., & Yates, P. A. (2009).  Chasing DiMaggio: 
Streaks in simulated seasons using non-constant at-bats. Journal of Quantitative 
Analysis in Sports, 5(2). 
Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). The lesson of bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 
4(4), 599-619. 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 121 
Rosenthal, R. (1979). The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. Psychological 
bulletin, 86(3), 638. 
Russell, B. (1906). The theory of implication. American Journal of Mathematics, 28(2), 159-
202. 
Schwitzgebel, E., & Rust, J. (2011). The self-reported moral behavior of ethics professors. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417–
457. 
Silvers, A., & Stein, M. A. (2003). Human rights and genetic discrimination: protecting 
genomics’ promise for public health. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 31(3), 
377-389. 
Simon, R. M. (2010). Gender differences in knowledge and attitude towards biotechnology. 
Public Understanding of Science 19, 642-653. 
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2008. Abstract + Concrete = Paradox. In J. Knobe and S. Nichols (Ed.). 
Experimental philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shepherd, J., & Justus, J. (2014). X-Phi and Carnapian Explication. Erkenntnis, 1–22. 
Slote, M. A. (1969). Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria. Inquiry, 12(1-
4), 317-338. 
Strawson, P. (1963). Freedom and resentment. Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, 67-100. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Moral heuristics. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(4), 531-542. 
Tabery, J. (2009). From a genetic predisposition to an interactive predisposition: rethinking the 
ethical implications of screening for gene-environment interactions. Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 34, 27-48. 
Factlessness & Faultlessness Holtzman 122 
 
Thomson, J. (1976) Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. The Monist, 59, 204-217. 
Tikkanen R,, Sjoberg R. L., Ducci F., Goldman D., Holi M., Tiihonen J., and Virkkunen M. 
(2009). Effects of MAOA‐genotype, alcohol consumption, and aging on violent 
behavior. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 33, 428-434. 
Tikkanen, R., Auvinen-Lointunen, L., Ducci, F., Sjoberg, R. L., Goldman, D., Tiihonen, 
Tobia, K., Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S. (2012). Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? 
Philosophical Psychology, 1–10. 
Tupes, E. C., & Christal, R. C. (1992). Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings. 
Journal of Personality, 60, 225-251.  
V.M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society (pp. 1771-1776). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. 
Van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Vohs, K. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief 
in determinism increases cheating. Psychological Science, 19(1), 49-54. 
Weisberg, D. S., Keil, F. C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., and Gray, J. R. (2008). The seductive 
allure of neuroscience explanations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 20, 470–477.  
Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1994). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans. Pears and McGuinness). 
